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The time series of various economic variables often exhibit asymmetry: decreases in the 
values tend to be sharp and fast, whereas increases usually occur slowly and gradually. We 
detect signs of an analogous asymmetry in firms’ wage setting behaviour on the basis of 
managerial surveys, with employers tending to react faster to negative than to positive 
shocks in the same variables. As well as describing the presence of asymmetry in the speed 
of wage adjustment, we investigate which companies are more likely to demonstrate it in 
their behaviour. For this purpose, we apply the Heckman selection model and develop a 
methodology that improves identification by exploiting heteroscedasticity in the selection 
equation. The estimation results imply that companies operating in a more competitive 
environment have a higher propensity to react asymmetrically. We also find that businesses 
relying on labour-intensive production technology are more likely to react faster to 
negative shocks. Both of these findings support the hypothesis that this behaviour results 
from companies’ attempts to protect profit margins. 
JEL Code: J30, J31, J33 
Keywords: wage dynamics, asymmetry, wage setting, survey 
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There is a substantial body of literature on asymmetries in the dynamics of 
prices. One of its key findings is that the pass-through of cost increases to 
prices is both stronger and faster than that of cost decreases. Another general 
tendency is that, conditional on price adjustment, the opposite pattern pre-
vails in the speed of price responses to demand shocks. We demonstrate that 
similar asymmetries are characteristic of wages as well: at the level of the 
firm, the speed and incidence of wage adjustments depend on the type and 
direction of shocks. Our evidence on the asymmetric incidence of wage 
changes conforms to downward nominal wage rigidity, but the findings on 
asymmetries in the speed of wage adjustment are novel. The main focus of 
the current paper is on analysing the possible reasons for the latter type of 
asymmetry, i.e. the tendency of firms to react to economic shocks with asym-
metric speed.     
Micro-level data from three surveys of private sector company managers 
in Estonia enable us to examine wage responses to shocks in six variables: 
positive and negative changes in sales turnover, output price, labour produc-
tivity, competitors’ wage level, inflation and unemployment. We find that the 
speed of wage adjustment is asymmetric in the case of the first four shocks. 
Conditional on wage adjustment, wages are changed more promptly to de-
creases than to increases in turnover, output price and productivity, whereas 
they are adjusted sooner after increases than decreases in competitors’ wages. 
Thus, in the former three cases, the pattern of speed asymmetry is similar to 
what is known as the positive asymmetry in the literature on asymmetric 
price transmission: adjustment of wages is faster when shocks squeeze profit 
margins and slower when they stretch them. The most natural explanation for 
this asymmetry is that it results from firms’ desire to protect profit margins.  
However, the same logic does not rationalize the more rapid adjustment of 
wages to increases than decreases in competitors’ wages; ceteris paribus, 
such behaviour would seem to harm rather than enhance profitability. In this 
case, our alternative hypothesis is that the asymmetry arises from the pay-
ment of efficiency wages. To maintain the wage premium, firms may be 
willing to adjust wages promptly when competitors’ wages rise but delay 
adjustment when competitors’ pay declines. 
We investigate how the asymmetries in the speed of wage responses relate 
to a number of firm-specific characteristics using standard probit and, to ad-
dress potential selection bias, probit with selection (Heckman probit). Also, 
to aid identification of the latter model in the absence of sound exclusion re-
strictions, we develop an extension of the model with heteroscedastic selec-
tion. For this purpose, we use an insight from the paper by Klein and Vella 6
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(2009), who show that it is possible to exploit heteroscedasticity in the binary 
selection equation to identify the structural model without exclusion restric-
tions. They discuss this method in the framework of a treatment model, 
whereas we apply their idea in the context of the Heckman probit model. By 
and large, our estimation results show that selection does not pose a major 
problem, and our main findings hold regardless of whether we model selec-
tion explicitly or not.         
For turnover, output price and productivity shocks, our estimation results 
imply that the speed asymmetry in wage adjustment is positively associated 
with product market competition and the labour intensity of production tech-
nology. Both of these findings support the hypothesis that this particular 
asymmetry results from firms’ attempts to protect profit margins. 
For shocks to competitors’ wages, we hypothesised that asymmetric wage 
adjustments result from the payment of efficiency wages. Consequently, we 
anticipated that the incidence of this asymmetry would co-vary with firm 
size, capital intensity, the share of skilled labour and piece-rate remunera- 
tion ʊ available firm-level characteristics that could be expected to correlate 
with firms’ propensity to pay efficiency wages. Of these, however, the only 
covariate we found to be significantly related to the asymmetry ʊ nega-
tively, as expected ʊ was the dummy variable for piece-rate remuneration. 
Hence, although our estimation results do not make the efficiency wage-
based explanation look implausible, we conclude that the underlying reasons 
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1. Introduction 
 
The time series of various economic variables, such as output, employ-
ment, etc., often exhibit asymmetry: decreases in the aggregate values tend to 
be sharp and fast, whereas increases usually occur slowly and gradually. 
Using the well-known quote by Keynes (1936: 314): “(…) the substitution of 
a downward for an upward tendency often takes place suddenly and violent-
ly, whereas there is, as a rule, no such sharp turning-point when an upward is 
substituted for a downward tendency”.  
In this paper, we describe a similar asymmetry in the behaviour of wages, 
using micro-data. Our analysis draws on three surveys of Estonian company 
managers that we carried out at two-year intervals in 2005–2009. We detect 
asymmetric behaviour in the response of wages to four types of shocks: 
changes in sales turnover, output price, labour productivity, and competitors’ 
wage level. A substantial share of employers react faster to a decrease than 
they do to an increase in the first three of these variables. An opposite pattern 
is detected in response to changes in competitors’ wages. This implies that 
companies react faster to negative than to positive shocks. In this context, the 
nature of the shock is determined from a company’s viewpoint: it is consid-
ered negative if it could reduce the profit margin and vice versa. 
For the first three of the variables, the asymmetric nature of the response is 
explainable by profit maximization: it is optimal from a company’s point of 
view to delay wage increases as long as possible and to implement wage cuts 
promptly, ceteris paribus. This type of asymmetric wage setting has a posi-
tive impact on profits, as long as the gains exceed the potential costs 
stemming from the adverse impact of such behaviour on workers’ effort. An 
asymmetric reaction is more likely in the presence of informational asymme-
tries where workers know less than the company does about the nature and 
the magnitude of the shocks. It can also be expected that the tendency to react 
asymmetrically is positively related to the employer’s bargaining power in 
wage negotiations. 
No similar profitability-based rationale can be used to explain the asym-
metry in response to changes in the wage levels of competitors. In this case, 
companies react faster to increases than to falls in competitor wages, which 
could have an adverse effect on the profit margin. We hypothesize that this 
pattern in wage setting may be the result of paying efficiency wages. Em-
loyers that follow a remuneration policy of setting their workers’ wages 
above the industry average also have an incentive to delay wage cuts and to 
increase wages promptly in response to changes in the external wage level.  
The accuracy of the profit-margin-based explanations can be assessed by 
investigating which companies are more likely to react faster to negative than 8
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to positive economic shocks. Our regression results indicate that the propen-
sity to react asymmetrically is higher for firms, which operate in a highly 
competitive environment and/or use labour-intensive production technolo-
gies. These findings support the rationale that companies use this wage set-
ting strategy because it has a positive effect on profit margins. First, competi-
tion increases the pressure on companies to use every possible means to in-
crease the margins, including asymmetric reaction. Second, the more labour-
intensive the production technology is, i.e. the higher the share of labour 
costs in total costs are, the stronger is the positive impact on profits that firms 
can achieve by delaying wage increases as long as possible and cutting wages 
as promptly as possible in response to shocks.  
In this respect, it is notable that the estimated effects for product market 
competition and production technology are significant only in those cases 
where the presence of asymmetry can be explained by the profit-margin-
based rationale, i.e. in the case of shocks to sales turnover, labour productivi-
ty and product prices. Neither of these variables is significantly related to the 
tendency to react asymmetrically in response to shocks in competitors’ 
wages. 
The regression analysis also allows us to investigate the hypothesis that 
the asymmetric reaction to competitors’ wages stems from a policy of paying 
efficiency wages. Although we have no direct way of measuring the extent of 
efficiency wage payments, we can analyse this possible link indirectly by 
assessing the relationship between wage setting asymmetry and the company 
characteristics which are associated with the likelihood of that company 
paying efficiency wages. For this purpose, we look at four variables: firm 
size, occupational structure, labour-intensity of production technology and 
use of piece-rate remuneration. 
There is substantial evidence that wages are higher in larger and/or more 
capital-intensive companies. This positive relationship is first and foremost 
caused by higher labour productivity in such firms. However, it may also re-
sult from a higher tendency to pay efficiency wages. Theoretical models pre-
dict that larger companies are more likely to use the strategy of paying effi-
ciency wages for two main reasons. First, monitoring the effort of workers is 
more costly (Oi, 1983) and second, search and training costs are higher than 
in small firms (Barron et al., 1987). Companies which use more capital-inten-
sive technology may opt to pay efficiency wages since worker effort is more 
valuable there (Layard et al., 2005). As argued in Babecký et al. (2010), high-
skilled workers are more likely to receive efficiency wages because of similar 
considerations: their effort is more difficult to monitor and more valuable to a 
given firm in terms of value added, and replacing them is more costly.  9
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1340
May 2011
 
An additional firm characteristic which may be associated with efficiency 
wages is remuneration on a piece-rate basis. One of the reasons why efficien-
cy wages are paid is that monitoring the effort of workers is costly. Since 
evaluation of labour productivity is nearly costless when employees are re-
munerated on a piece-rate basis, we can expect that this type of remuneration 
is associated with a lower tendency to pay efficiency wages.   
For the above-given reasons, we expected to find a positive relationship 
between firm size, capital intensity, and/or the share of high-skilled workers 
on the one hand and the asymmetric reaction speed to shocks in competitors’ 
wage level on the other. In addition, we anticipated that the indicator for 
piece-rate remuneration should be negatively associated with this variable. 
Our regression analysis, however, supported only one of these implications: 
the estimated effect for the dummy of piece-rate remuneration was indeed 
negative, but the marginal effects for the other variables were insignificant. 
Thus, we were not able to provide strong evidence supporting the hypothesis 
that asymmetric reaction to competitors’ wage level is driven by the payment 
of efficiency wages, which leaves open the question of what the reasons for 
this pattern are.
1  
In addition to the asymmetries in reaction speed, we detected another type 
of asymmetry in wage setting: companies are more likely to increase wages 
in response to a shock than to cut them. This finding corresponds with nu-
merous previous empirical studies that demonstrate the existence of down-
ward rigidity in nominal wages.
2 Since this type of asymmetry in wage set-
ting has been extensively covered by the existing literature, we focus on the 
asymmetric reaction speed, a topic which to our knowledge has not been 
analysed before.  
The current paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present an 
overview of the related literature describing analogous asymmetries in the 
dynamics of prices. Section 3 analyses various characteristics of the Estonian 
labour market which could be associated with the tendency of wages to react 
asymmetrically. Section 4 describes the data used in the current analysis. 
Section 5 gives a detailed overview of the asymmetries detected and the dis-
                                                 
1 An alternative explanation for the asymmetry described above could be non-rational be-
haviour, which may be related to loss aversion. An asymmetric pattern in wage setting may 
simply stem from a general tendency of economic agents to react to negative news more 
promptly than to positive news. Indeed, there is ample evidence of asymmetric time series 
dynamics of the same kind for various other variables. (An overview of the related literature 
for prices is presented in the next section.) However, we are not aware of the use of this 
explanation in the existing literature, and it is not possible to test its validity in the context of 
the current study.  
2 E.g. Campbell and Kamlani, 1997; Bewley, 1999; Dickens et al., 2007, Biscourp et al., 
2005.  10
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tributions of lagged responses to various shocks. In Section 6 we investigate 
which companies are more prone to react with asymmetric speed. For this 
purpose, we employ probit and Heckman probit models, and also a modified 
version of the latter for which we develop a methodology for identifying the 
Heckman structural model from heteroscedasticity in the selection equation. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Overview of the related literature: asymmetric 
reaction speed in price setting  
 
Although the asymmetric reaction speed of wages has not been described 
before, there is an abundant parallel literature which analyses a similar phe-
nomenon in the movements of prices. Studies assessing price transmission 
describe asymmetric lagged responses to two types of shock. First, prices 
tend to respond faster to increases than to falls in costs. Overviews of the 
research analysing this type of asymmetry are given by Peltzman (2000) and 
Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2005) among others.
3 Second, prices tend 
to respond faster to falls than to increases in demand, as shown in an article 
by Fabiani et al (2006) which draws on data from nine EU countries and, like 
the current analysis, is based on managerial surveys.
4  
There is an obvious analogy in the nature of asymmetries in the reaction 
speeds of prices and wages. An increase in cost and a fall in demand are neg-
ative shocks from a company’s perspective. Consequently, it appears that 
companies react faster to negative than to positive shocks in price setting, as 
they do in the wage setting process.  
The most common explanation for the first type of asymmetry in pricing 
behaviour, (i.e. the tendency to react faster to input price increases than falls 
by changing output prices) is that, when possible, firms try to delay actions 
which result in a squeeze of their profit margins, whereas they react promptly 
if a price change stretches the margin. To be able to do this, companies need 
to exhibit market power, and this type of asymmetric reaction speed is often 
described in the context of monopolistic or oligopolistic behaviour. For ex-
ample, such asymmetries in the price transmission process are often observed 
in the middle levels of the marketing chain for agricultural products and in 
gasoline markets (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2005). In both types of 
                                                 
3 Most of the analysis in this strand of literature is dedicated to assessing the impact of 
changes in input prices on output prices.  
4 Blinder et al. (1998) analysed the asymmetric reaction speed of prices in response to de-
mand and cost shocks on the basis of a US managerial survey and came to the conclusion 
that the asymmetry is neither significant in a statistical sense nor very large economically. 
Their results may be influenced by a relatively small sample size.   11
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1340
May 2011
 
markets, it is argued, the asymmetric behaviour reflects the oligopolistic 
power of market participants who set the retail prices. However, the evidence 
that market concentration is positively associated with this type of asymmetry 
is inconclusive (Peltzman, 2000). 
It is more difficult to put forward a similar argument for the second type of 
asymmetry in pricing behaviour (i.e. the tendency to react faster to a fall in 
demand). The impact of a price reduction on a company’s revenues depends 
on the elasticity of demand – it has a positive effect only when demand is 
elastic (i.e. elasticity exceeds one). We can conjecture from this that the sec-
ond type of asymmetry in pricing behaviour is more likely to be found in 
competitive markets, where the elasticity of demand is high (it is infinitely 
elastic in the case of perfect competition). As far as we know, this hypothesis 
has not been tested in the existing literature.
3. Characteristics of the Estonian labour market that 
are associated with asymmetric reaction  
 
The survey results indicate that Estonian businesses react to economic 
shocks by changing wages with asymmetric speed. To our knowledge, there 
are no previous studies that detect this pattern either in Estonia or in other 
countries. The tendency to react asymmetrically to shocks may be influenced 
by the institutional framework of the labour markets and norms for wage 
setting, which can differ substantially across countries. In this section we 
describe some institutional characteristics of the Estonian labour market and 
features of wage-setting behaviour that can be associated with asymmetric 
behaviour.  
It can be assumed that the more flexible the wage setting regime is, the 
more likely it is that companies will react to economic shocks with asym-
metric speed. An institutional characteristic which is likely to be influential in 
this respect is collective bargaining coverage. Bargaining at the individual 
level would increase the ability of the company to choose the reaction speed 
in response to shocks, whereas collectively bargained wage contracts would 
lower this ability for two main reasons. First, collectively bargained contracts 
fix wages for a specific (usually pre-defined) time period, which is less likely 
to be the case for individual bargaining. Second, collective bargaining is 
usually associated with greater rigidity in wage setting, a finding which is 
confirmed by several studies (e.g. Holden and Fulfsberg, 2008; Babecký et 
al., 2010). The level at which collective wage bargaining takes place is also 
relevant. The more decentralised the bargaining structure, the larger the 
possibility that companies can react to company-specific shocks by changing 
wages, which also means that the likelihood of there being an asymmetric 
reaction speed is higher. 12
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In the European context, the level of collective bargaining in the Estonian 
labour market is very low. Since the current study covers only private sector 
businesses, we compare collective bargaining coverage and the incidence of 
union contracts negotiated at different levels for this part of the economy 
only. Table 1 presents this information for 15 EU member states. This evi-
dence shows that Estonia has the lowest collective bargaining coverage 
among the countries sampled, with only 8.7 percent of workers covered by 
collective agreements. The incidence of bargaining contracts agreed outside 
the company is especially low, with only 3.4 percent of private sector busi-
nesses covered by higher-level agreements. For the reasons outlined above, 
the institutional framework of wage setting in Estonia makes it more proba-
ble that asymmetries can be observed in wage setting. It is less likely that 
such patterns would be detected in highly unionised EU countries, whereas 
they are more likely to be present in countries like the USA where the level 
of collective bargaining coverage is similar to that of Estonia.    
Another institutional characteristic that affects wage rigidity is the strict-
ness of employment protection legislation (EPL). According to recent theo-
retical and empirical work, strict EPL increases downward wage rigidity. 
Holden (2004) has developed a theoretical model, which shows that when 
strict EPL is combined with strong negotiating power of labour unions, the 
likelihood that companies would cut nominal wages is significantly lowered. 
Holden reasons that EPL increases wage rigidity because collectively nego-
tiated wage agreements mean that wage cuts need the mutual consent of 
employers and employees. Such cuts are harder to make if strong EPL means 
that the threat of redundancies is more difficult for the company to imple-
ment. There is also empirical evidence that supports Holden’s theoretical 
work. The analysis by Babetsky et al. (2010) implies that strict EPL is associ-
ated with stronger downward rigidity in nominal wages and this effect is 
more substantial in companies where a larger share of the workforce consists 
of permanent workers. In this context, it is worth noting that in most of the 
countries that the study of Babestky et al. covers, wage reductions require the 
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Table 1: Collective bargaining coverage, incidence of union contracts and 
strictness of employment protection legislation in 15 EU Member States  
Notes: Figures are employment-weighted and re-scaled to exclude non-responses. The data refer 
to private sector businesses and are based on the WDN wage and price setting surveys that were 
carried out in 2007 or 2008. The reference year is 2006.  
Source: Babecký et al (2010).  
 
 
As argued above, strict EPL imposes stronger downward wage rigidity. 
This in turn means that asymmetries in the speed of wage adjustment are less 
likely to be observed in countries with strict EPL, since firms need to be able 
to change wages in both directions in order for an observer to detect asym-
metric behaviour.  
The last column of Table 1 gives an overview of the strictness of employ-
ment protection legislation on the basis of an EPL index. EPL indices for  
EU-15 member states are based on OECD (2004) and analogous indices for 
the new member states are based on Tonin (2005), which replicates the 
OECD methodology. The EPL index can range from 0 to 6, with higher 
scores representing stricter regulation. The figures presented in Table 1 show 
that the strictness of employment protection in Estonia was close to the EU 

















Austria 94.6  97.8  23.3  96.2  2.15 
Belgium 89.3  99.4  35.3 97.9  2.50 
Czech Republic  50.2  54.0  51.4  17.5  2.02 
Estonia    8.7  12.1  10.4    3.4  2.33 
France 67.1  99.9  58.7  98.8  3.07 
Greece 91.0  93.4  20.8  85.9  2.89 
Hungary  18.4  19.0  19.0            0  2.90 
Ireland 42.2  72.4  31.3  68.3  1.65 
Italy 97.0  99.6  42.9  99.6  1.32 
Lithuania  15.6  24.2  23.7    0.8  2.44 
Netherlands 67.6  75.5  30.1  45.4  2.81 
Poland  19.3  22.9  21.4    4.7  2.27 
Portugal 55.5  62.1 9.9 58.9  2.22 
Slovenia  N/A          100.0  25.7  74.3  3.49 
Spain  96.8       100.0  16.9  83.1  2.63 
Total 67.8  76.4  33.0  65.5  2.50 
Euro area  84.5  94.2  35.6  87.3  2.63 
Non-euro area  24.1  27.7  26.3  6  2.15 14
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no sharp contrast in EPL between Estonia and the EU-15 member states. 
However, EPL tends to be stricter in the EU than in other industrial countries. 
Thus, in comparison with e.g. the USA (where the value of the EPL index 


























































































































































more than once a year once a year once every two years less frequently  never/don't know
Figure 1: Frequency of base wage changes 
Notes: The figure presents the share of companies who change wages at the given frequency. Fig-
ures are employment-weighted and re-scaled to exclude non-responses. The data is based on the 
2007/2008 WDN survey. 
Source: Druant et al. (2009). 
 
 
An aspect of wage setting which might also be relevant in this context is 
the duration of wage contracts. It can be presumed that speed-related asym-
metries are more likely to be detected if the frequency of wage changes is 
high. This positive relationship is explainable by purely statistical reasons: 
asymmetric behaviour is more likely to be observed for companies that 
change wages more often. Figure 1 gives an overview of the wage change 
frequency in 15 EU member states. The countries are ordered by the share of 
companies that change wages more often than once a year (i.e. with the 
highest frequency). As can be seen from Figure 1, frequency distributions are 
quite similar across countries. With a few exceptions (Lithuania and Italy), 
the mode frequency is once a year. The frequency of wage changes in Estonia 
is not very different from the sample average.  15
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Another feature that might affect the propensity to react asymmetrically to 
economic shocks is related to the timing of wage changes. Broadly speaking, 
companies fall into two categories: they either apply time-dependent or state-
dependent wage changing rules. It is plausible to assume that firms which 
follow state-dependent rules are more likely to have asymmetric wage set-
ting, as even if the likelihood of being hit by different types of economic 
shock varies seasonally to some extent, we can expect that most of the shocks 
will still occur sporadically. In this respect, it is relevant that 58% of Estonian 
companies apply state-dependent wage changing rules. As can be seen from 
Figure 2, this share is relatively high in comparison to the other EU countries 


























































































































































Figure 2: Prevalence of state-dependent wage setting rules  
Notes: The graph presents the share of firms who rely on state-dependent wage setting. Figures 
are employment-weighted and re-scaled to exclude non-responses. The data is based on the 
2007/2008 WDN survey. 
Source: Druant et al. (2009). 
 
 
Yet another aspect of wage setting which may affect asymmetric behav-
iour is the payment of bonuses. The related survey questions ask how fast 
firms adjust the total wage bill (i.e. the base wage plus bonus). Since it is 
easier to adjust flexible wage components than base wages, it can be assumed 
that companies paying performance-related bonuses are more likely to react 
to shocks by changing wages. As asymmetric reaction can only be detected if 
firms are reacting to shocks, we are more likely to observe asymmetric reac-
tion in countries where a large share of companies pay bonuses. We should 
note that in this context we are only discussing the link between the possibil-
ity of observing an asymmetric reaction and the use of flexible pay compo-16
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nents. The direct link between the payment of bonuses and an asymmetric re-
action speed is more likely to be negative than positive, at least for shocks 







































































































































Share of firms paying bonuses Share of bonuses in total pay
Figure 3: Payment of performance-related bonuses 
Notes: Countries are ordered on the basis of the proportion of companies that pay bonuses. Fig-
ures are employment-weighted and re-scaled to exclude non-responses. 
Source: WDN Survey 2007/2008. 
 
 
Figure 3 gives an overview of the share of firms paying bonuses and the 
proportion of bonuses in the total wage bill in 12 EU countries. Countries are 
ordered by the first variable. The share of companies that use flexible pay 
components is 78% in Estonia, which is above the sample average. 
The prevalence of piece-rate remuneration is associated with the detection 
of wage setting asymmetries for reasons that are similar to the payment of 
bonuses. Firms that remunerate on a piece-rate basis are more likely to adjust 
wages (i.e. the total wage bill) in response to changes in the economic envi-
ronment, in particular to changes in labour productivity and sales turnover. 
Thus the likelihood of observing an asymmetric reaction is higher in coun-
tries where a large share of firms remunerate on a piece-rate basis.
5 Figure 4 
depicts the distributions of companies applying different remuneration meth-
                                                 
5 As discussed in Section 6, piece-rate remuneration is negatively related with asymmetric 
reaction speed to shocks in competitors’ wages. 17
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ods across 10 EU member states. The incidence of piece-rate remuneration is 
quite high in Estonia: 26% of companies remunerate employees in the main 
occupational group on a piece-rate basis, which is the second highest share 






















































































































Hourly base wage Piece-rate base wage Monthly base wage Other
Figure 4: Remuneration methods 
Notes: The figure presents the percentage of companies who use each remuneration method for 
their main (most numerous) occupational group. Countries are ordered by the proportion of com-
panies which remunerate on a piece-rate basis. Figures are employment-weighted and re-scaled 
to exclude non-responses. 
Source: WDN Survey 2007/2008. 
4. Data description  
 
Our analysis is based on three surveys of Estonian company managers, 
which were conducted at two-year intervals in 2005–2009. The first of the 
three managerial surveys was designed by a team of researchers at the Bank 
of Estonia that included the authors of the current study. An overview of this 
survey, including a copy of its questionnaire, is provided by Rõõm and Uus-
küla (2009). The next two surveys were carried out in the framework of the 
Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), a research network set up by the European 
System of Central Banks for the purpose of conducting research into wage 
setting and labour cost dynamics, and their implications for monetary policy. 
The WDN surveys were implemented by the national central banks that par-18
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ticipated in the network. The first WDN survey covered 16 European Union 
countries
6 and, depending on the country, was carried out either in the second 
half of 2007 or in the first quarter of 2008. Its aim was to collect internation-
ally comparable data on the wage and price setting practices of companies, 
information that was not generally available from other sources. The second 
WDN survey was conducted in summer 2009 in 11 EU member states.
7 The 
purpose of the later survey was to analyse the wage setting behaviour of 
companies in the context of the financial and economic crisis that started in 
the autumn of 2008.  
The harmonised questionnaires of both WDN surveys contained core sets 
of questions, which were used in all the countries.
8 In addition some coun-
tries, including Estonia, extended the surveys in several directions. The block 
of questions on the speed of reaction to economic shocks in wage setting, 
which is the focus of the current study, was only covered by the surveys con-
ducted in Estonia. 
The three Estonian surveys were carried out in August–September 2005, 
September–October 2007 and May–June 2009. Most of the survey questions 
asked about wage setting practices either with reference to the previous 
economic year, which is typically the previous calendar year, or in more 
general terms. The Bank of Estonia commissioned all of these surveys from 
an external company (EMOR), which conducted the 2005 survey by 
telephone and carried out the 2007 and 2009 surveys over the internet.   
The target population of companies for all three surveys was defined using 
the Estonian business registry, excluding companies employing less than five 
people. To ensure better coverage, sampling was stratified along three dimen-
sions of sector, size and location, though not in exactly the same way in each 
survey. The stratification of the 2005 survey was based on three economic 
sectors, primary, secondary and tertiary, and three firm size groups (5–9, 10–
49, and 50 or more employees). The 2007 and 2009 surveys, however, were 
stratified across three somewhat different sector groups
9 and size 
                                                 
6 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. 
7 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Poland and Spain. 
8 For a more detailed description of the WDN survey see Druant et al. (2009). 
9 The three sector groups were as follows: i) manufacturing, electricity, gas and water 
supply, and construction (NACE codes D, E, F, respectively); ii) trade and restaurants, codes 
G, H; iii) transport, storage and communications, financial intermediation, and real estate, 
renting and other business activities, codes I, J, K. This coding and classification of sectors 
refers to EMTAK 2003, a NACE-compatible classification system that Statistics Estonia 
(SE) used before 2008. Even though SE has switched to an updated system (EMTAK, 2008) 
since then, we continue referring to the older classification, because the business registry 
database used for sampling in our surveys was based on EMTAK 2003.  19
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10 When looking at company location, all three sampling schemes 
differentiated between Tallinn and the rest of Estonia. In total, the sample 
scheme involved 18 strata in 2005 and 2007, and 24 strata in 2009.  
The 2005 survey, which was based on telephone interviews with executive 
managers, achieved a relatively high response rate of 60 percent. The final 
sample for this survey consisted of 250 observations (firms). The realised 
samples for the 2007 and 2009 surveys, which asked the managers to fill in 
internet-based questionnaires, covered 439 and 567 companies. The response 
rates for these surveys were much lower at 25 and 30 percent, respectively. 
The likely reason for the considerably higher response rate in the first survey 
was the difference in the survey methods (telephone vs. internet).  
To see how the basic structure of our survey samples compares to that of 
the target population, we examine the distributions of companies across sev-
eral economic sectors and firm size categories in our data and the business 
registry. In particular, we distinguish between four types of economic activity 
(manufacturing, construction, trade, and market services)
11 and four firm size 
groups (5–19, 20–49, 50–99, and 100 or more employees) and compare the 
corresponding distributions of companies and employment in each of our 
three survey samples, in a pooled data set and in the target population of 
companies.
12 The comparison leads to three main insights. First, our survey 
samples over-represent manufacturing and under-represent trade and market 
services (though this pattern holds only for the distribution of companies, not 
of employment). Second, as a result of the stratified sampling described 
above, the mismatch between the survey samples and the population is much 
larger for size groups than sectors: there is considerable under-sampling of 
small companies (5–19 employees) and over-sampling of medium-sized and 
large companies (50–99, and 100 and more employees). Finally, there are 
clear structural similarities between each of our three survey samples. That is 
encouraging, because in the empirical part of the paper we regard the three 
data sets as comparable and even pool them.    
In light of the structural differences noted above between the target popu-
lation and our survey samples, we constructed employment-based weights 
that can be used to adjust sample statistics in accordance with the distribution 
of employment in the population of companies. More specifically, we post-
stratified the pooled data using the sectors and firm size categories shown in 
                                                 
10 The size categories were 5–19, 20–49, 50–99, and 100 and more employees. In the 
2007 sampling design, the two smallest categories (5–19 and 20–49) were not distinguished.  
11 Market services combine hotels and restaurants (H), transport, storage and communica-
tions (I), and real estate, renting and other business activities (K).  
12 The details of this comparison are shown in Appendix 1.  20
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13 and then computed the weights as the amount of employment 
that companies in a given stratum need to represent, on average, in order to 
account for the total employment of that particular stratum in the whole pop-
ulation of companies.
14 By construction, the structure of the sample weights 
thus obtained exactly matches the population distribution of employment 
across the sectors and firm size groups implied by the chosen stratification 
(see column 5 of Panel D in Appendix 1). 
We apply the weights to adjust all of the descriptive statistics discussed in 
Section 5 but not the econometric models estimated in Section 6. We esti-
mate the latter without weights and instead include sets of dummy variables 
to control for potential sector and size effects. The main reason why we pre-
fer this approach is that it allows us to shift emphasis from the incidence of 
asymmetric behaviour to the potential mechanisms or factors driving it. In-
sights about the degree to which various asymmetries in wage setting are 
more or less widespread or economically relevant, because they concern a 
more or less substantial share of employment, can be gained from a variety of 
descriptive statistics discussed in Section 5.  
From the methodological point of view, survey data analysis offers a num-
ber of advantages, as well as certain limitations and potential risks. An obvi-
ous benefit of collecting the data from managerial surveys is that it permits 
analysis of the causal effect, meaning there is no need to worry about prob-
lems arising from the potential endogeneity of the dependent variable. A 
drawback of the reliance on this type of data is that the estimated effects may 
be biased. There are two potential sources of bias associated with the conduct 
of surveys like ours. One is attributable to measurement error, as the assess-
ments by the company managers of the potential response lag to shocks may 
not completely correspond with their actual behaviour. There is no way for us 
to address this problem in the context of the current survey. However, we can 
draw associations from the empirical literature on similar subjects, including 
asymmetric reaction speed in price setting. The findings about prices that use 
managerial surveys like the one we conducted (e.g. Fabiani et al., 2006) agree 
with the evidence from data on the actual dynamics of prices (Peltzman, 
2000; Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2005). A second related subject is 
the evidence from another type of asymmetry in the dynamics of wages, in 
the tendency of firms to react more to shocks that induce wage increases (i.e. 
downward nominal wage rigidity). In this case, the assessments from mana-
gerial surveys (e.g. Babecký et al., 2010) are also strongly correlated with the 
                                                 
13 We also discriminated between two locations, Tallinn and the rest of the country, so 
the total number of strata was 32. 
14 Therefore, the weights are strata-specific, and their sum within a stratum is equal to the 
total employment of that stratum in the target population; the sum of weights across all 
sample firms is equal to the total employment in the population.  21
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estimates based on actual wage changes (e.g. Dickens, et al., 2007). Thus, we 
have good reason to believe that what we detect from the managerial surveys 
on the asymmetric reaction speed for wages is not a phantom phenomenon.  
Another potential bias associated with managerial surveys, or indeed sur-
veys of any kind, comes from low response rates. For our study, the bias 
caused by this type of sample censoring can arise when some unobserved 
characteristics of companies (or firm managers) are linked to the propensity 
for an asymmetric reaction speed. While the linkages between the response 
rate and selection bias are obvious for issues where differences in company 
behaviour are directly related to management quality, it is difficult to propose 
good reasons why this might be the case for the present study, although we 
should reiterate that this possibility cannot be ruled out 
 
 
5. Asymmetries in wage setting  
 
Our wage setting surveys inquired about six types of shock: sales turnover, 
output price, labour productivity, competitors’ wage level, inflation, and un-
employment.
15 Company managers were asked whether changes in each of 
these variables have an effect on wages and if so, how quickly these changes 
affect wages, including bonuses. Appendix 2 gives an overview of the related 
survey questions. For each of the variables, we asked separately how long the 
response lag is for an increase in a particular variable and for a decrease in it. 
Managers’ answers indicated that the reaction to shocks is asymmetric. We 
detected two types of asymmetry, one related to the reaction speed and the 
other to the propensity to react to a given shock. 
 
 
5.1. First asymmetry: companies react faster to negative 
shocks  
 
Table 2 shows the proportions of companies that react to a negative eco-
nomic shock faster than, at the same speed as, or slower than they do to a 
positive shock. The nature of the shock (positive vs. negative) is determined 
from the company’s point of view: shocks that could have an adverse effect 
on the profit margin are considered negative shocks and vice versa. Follow-
ing this logic, increases in sales turnover, product price or labour productivity 
are defined as positive shocks, whereas an increase in competitors’ wage 
level is classified as a negative shock.  
                                                 
15 The first survey, which was carried out in 2005, covered only three variables: sales 
turnover, output price, and labour productivity.  22
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An increase in unemployment is considered a positive shock for a particu-
lar company, since it is associated with lower wage pressure and better avail-
ability of workers. However, it is not clear how company managers inter-
preted this question in the survey context, as an increase in unemployment 
has a negative connotation from the macroeconomic perspective and thus 
they could also perceive it as a negative shock. 
For the last type of shock, changes in inflation, it is not possible to associ-
ate the direction of a shock with a positive or negative effect. From a partic-
ular company’s point of view an increase in inflation can have a neutral, neg-
ative or positive effect, depending on how the prices of the company’s output 
and input factors change.  
As the figures presented in Table 2 indicate, a substantial share of com-
panies react with a longer time lag to a positive shock than to a negative 
shock for the four variables which we consider: sales turnover, output price, 
labour productivity and competitors’ wage level. For each of these four 
shocks, this share is significantly larger than the proportion of firms that are 
subject to the opposite asymmetry (i.e. react slower to a negative shock) and 
the corresponding t-statistics are highly significant. The difference in reaction 














Sales turnover  0.215  0.758  0.027  12.1  809 
Product price  0.158  0.813  0.028  8.4  679 
Labour productivity  0.126  0.817  0.057  5.1  920 
Wages of competitors   0.105 0.870 0.024 5.8  604 
Inflation  0.029  0.950  0.021        –0.8  541 
Unemployment 0.047  0.901  0.052  0.3  530 
Notes: We define as a negative shock a decrease in sales turnover, product price, labour produc-
tivity and the unemployment rate and an increase in competitors’ wage level. Figures are employ-
ment-weighted. 
* We do not associate the direction of change with the nature of the shock in the case of inflation. 
The figures presented show the proportion of companies who react faster, similarly or slower to 
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The figures presented in Table 2 imply that the asymmetry is most pro-
nounced in response to turnover shocks: 22 percent of companies react faster 
to a fall in turnover than they do to an increase, whereas only 3 percent of 
companies react in the opposite manner. Comparing these proportions across 
separate surveys shows that the asymmetries were most pronounced in 2009 
and least so in 2005 (see Appendix 4). Such variation may reflect the fact that 
the surveys were conducted at different phases of the business cycle, but it 
could also stem from a change in the survey method. The earliest survey was 
conducted by telephone, whereas the two later ones were carried out over the 
internet with company managers filling in electronic questionnaires.  
The two earlier surveys were carried out in an upward phase of the busi-
ness cycle while the 2009 survey was conducted during an economic down-
turn (see Appendix 3 for an overview of the main economic indicators for 
Estonia). This may also influence the findings, inasmuch as the reaction of 
companies to negative news may be sharper in the recession, a tendency 
which is reflected in stronger asymmetry. In this context, it is noteworthy that 
the asymmetry is more pronounced in 2009 for sales turnover and labour pro-
ductivity. It is less pronounced for competitors’ wage, which fits with the 
earlier assertion that adverse conditions enhanced the asymmetry, since the 
situation in the labour market improved from a company point of view during 
2009. The earlier years (especially the last years of the boom, i.e. 2007 and 
2008) were characterised by a very tight labour market, whereas 2009 was 
characterised by considerable labour market easing.  
 
 
5.2. Second asymmetry: companies react more likely to shocks 
that lead to wage increases  
 
Table 3 depicts the proportion of firms that react to a given shock by 
changing wages. The figures presented in the Table imply that the reaction is 
more likely in response to an increase than to a decrease in a given variable. 
This asymmetry is highly significant for all the variables that we specified, 
except unemployment, indicating that wages are more rigid downward than 
upward - a finding that corresponds with numerous previous empirical 
studies which demonstrate the existence of downward rigidity in nominal 
wages (e.g. Bewley, 1999; Dickens et al., 2007).  
We also assessed the reaction probability for each survey separately (see 
Appendix 5). The asymmetry described above is significant for all variables 
except unemployment in the samples based on the two earlier surveys. Inter-
estingly, the asymmetry is much less pronounced in the 2009 survey, and for 
some variables it is even reversed. Companies react more to falls than to rises 
in sales turnover and product price whereas the difference in reaction 24
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probabilities is insignificant for labour productivity. Inflation and the wage 
levels of competitors are the only variables for which the asymmetry that was 
present in the earlier surveys still exists, i.e. the likelihood of reaction is still 
larger in response to a shock that would lead to an increase in wages. 
 
 
Table 3: Share of companies reacting by changing wages in response to a 
particular shock  
 
Shock  React to increase  React to decrease  t-statistic  Observations 
Sales turnover  0.739  0.687  2.9  1214 
Product price  0.614  0.577  1.9  1195 
Labour productivity 0.855  0.794  3.9  1183 
Competitors' wage   0.817  0.669  7.3    913 
Inflation  0.741  0.595  6.7    895 
Unemployment  0.649  0.635  0.6    895 
Note: Figures are employment-weighted 
 
 
The data on response patterns in the 2009 survey correspond with alterna-
tive evidence stemming from the same survey which shows that downward 
nominal wage rigidity considerably eased in Estonia during the economic 
downturn in 2009. By May or June 2009, about 44% of companies had 
lowered nominal wages since the beginning of the crisis (Messina and Rõõm, 
2009). This implies that when downward wage rigidity is not a strongly 
binding constraint, then the asymmetries in response probabilities follow a 
pattern which is analogous to that of asymmetric reaction speed. For both 
types of asymmetry, companies react more sharply in response to negative 
news.  Firms are more likely to react to a fall in turnover or product price, 
both of which are negative events from a company’s point of view. They are 
more likely to react to increases in competitors’ wages or in the inflation rate, 
which are also negative events. 
 We described the analogy between prices and wages in asymmetric reac-
tion speed in Section 2. It is noteworthy that the dynamics of prices and 
wages become even more similar when downward nominal wage rigidity is 
less pronounced. The asymmetries in price setting are described in Fabiani et 
al. (2006). According to their study, companies are more likely to react to 
negative shocks by changing prices and the reaction is faster than it is for 
positive shocks to the same variables.
16 We observe the same types of asym-
metries in the dynamics of wages in Estonian companies in 2009.  
                                                 
16 They analyse companies’ reaction to cost and demand shocks.  25
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5.3. Reaction speed to shocks  
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the reaction speed. For all types of 
shock the modal reaction speed is one year or more. This corresponds with 
the general wage setting frequency, which has a mode of one wage change 
per year (see Figure 1).
17  The reaction of companies is fastest to changes in 
labour productivity with 24 percent reacting to a productivity increase and 27 
percent to a decrease within one month. Firms also react relatively fast to 
changes in sales turnover and product prices, whereas the average time lag in 
reaction to changes in competitors’ wages, unemployment and inflation is 
much longer. The response is slowest in the aftermath of changes in inflation, 
with only 2 percent changing wages within one month, while 74 percent react 
to a rise in the inflation rate and 70 percent to a fall with a lag of one year or 
more. The pattern of reaction does not differ substantially across surveys con-
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Figure 5: Proportion of businesses that react to different shocks within a 
given time period 
Note: Figures are employment-weighted. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Wage setting frequency refers to base wages, whereas reaction speed to shocks refers 
to the total wage bill of base wage plus bonus. It can be expected that the dynamics of the 
total wage are less staggered than the dynamics of the base wage.  26
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6. Asymmetric reaction speed: regression analysis  
 
The following regression estimations focus on analysing the first type of 
asymmetry described in the previous section, the tendency of companies to 
react faster to negative than to positive shocks. These assessments are per-
formed for the variables for which the asymmetry was detected: sales turn-
over, output price, labour productivity and competitors’ wage level. The pur-
pose of the analysis is to relate the likelihood of an asymmetric reaction to a 
number of company-specific characteristics, such as firm size, occupational 
structure, etc. In addition, we analyse the effects of product market competi-
tion and collective wage bargaining. Appendix 7 gives an overview of the un-
conditional means of the regression variables, differentiating between com-
panies that react asymmetrically to shocks in a particular variable, and the 
rest of the sample. 
We start by estimating probit regression equations, where the dependent 
variable is a binary variable indicating an asymmetric reaction speed to 
shocks. Thereafter we estimate the same relationship using the Heckman 
probit model. We employ the Heckman methodology since asymmetric reac-
tion can only be observed if a company reacts to positive and negative shocks 
in a particular variable and some regression covariates may be related both to 
the propensity to react and to the likelihood of the reaction being asymmetric. 
This method enables us to correct the possible selection bias that may arise 
from non-random data censoring. The selection equation estimates the pro-
pensity of a given variable to react to shocks, both positive and negative. The 
structural equation estimates the propensity for a given variable to react 
asymmetrically by reacting faster to negative than to positive shocks. 
The validity of the results of the Heckman selection model depends on two 
assumptions. First, the correct estimation of the model relies on the assump-
tion that the regression residuals are jointly normally distributed. Second, 
model identification requires the selection equation to have a source of varia-
tion which is not related to the structural equation.  
One possible way of identifying the model is to use exclusion restrictions, 
i.e. a variable or a set of variables which enter the selection equation but are 
not included in the structural equation. This involves the assumptions that 
these variables only affect the probability of selection and that they are not 
related to the outcomes of the structural equation. It is often difficult to find 
variables which satisfy these assumptions. The model that we use in the 
current paper faces the same problem, i.e. it is hard to find variables which 
are related to the propensity to react to shocks, but do not affect the 
likelihood of the reaction speed being asymmetric.  27
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When exclusion restrictions are not available then the model can be identi-
fied on the basis of the assumption of the joint normality of regression residu-
als. However, this may result in poor identification and high multicollinearity 
in the structural equation, since normal probability function is nearly linear 
for a large range of values and exhibits non-linearities only in the tails (see 
e.g. Moffitt, 1999).  
To overcome the problems related to model identification, we use an in-
sight from the paper by Klein and Vella (2009), who show that it is possible 
to exploit heteroscedasticity in the binary selection equation to identify the 
structural model without exclusion restrictions. They discuss this method in 
the framework of a treatment model, while we apply their idea in the context 
of the Heckman probit. We describe the details of our estimation methodolo-
gy in the following subsection.  
 
 
6.1. Estimation methodology 
 
To reiterate, our dependent variables are binary indicators of asymmetry in 
the speed of wage adjustment that we define as follows. Let  n i ,.. 2 , 1 =  index 
firms, and  {} w a p t s , , , ∈  indicate the type of shock: turnover, product price, 
productivity or competitor wage, respectively. For  {} a p t s , , ∈ , we set the 
binary outcome variable  is Y 1  equal to 1 if wage adjustment is faster when a 
shock lowers the affected economic variable, i.e. when turnover, product 
price or productivity declines, and 0 otherwise. In contrast, for the shock to 
competitor wages ( w s = ),  is Y 1 equals 1 if the firm’s own wages are adjusted 
more promptly when competitor wages rise than when they fall;  is Y 1  is 0 
otherwise. 
As noted above, we first assume that the asymmetric response of firms to 
shocks can be described by a standard probit model: 
[] 0 1 1 > + = is s i is X Y ε β ,  (1) 
where [] ⋅  is the indicator function;  i X1  is a row vector of observed exogenous 
variables;  s β  is a vector of unknown true parameters; and  is ε  is the unob-
served component, distributed independently of  i X1  according to standard 
normal. Under these assumptions, parameters  s β  can be estimated by MLE. 
Note however, that for a given type of shock s, the outcome  is Y 1  is ob-
served only for those firms that react to the shock in both directions; that is, 28
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is Y 1  has missing values if wages are adjusted in response only to positive or 
to negative realisations of the shock, or if wages are not adjusted at all. This 
suggests that a more appropriate characterisation of the data generating 
process might be probit with selection: 
                                 [] 0 1 1 > + = is s i is X Y ε β  and if  1 2 = is Y ,  (2) 
                                 [] 0 2 2 > + = is s i is v X Y δ ,  (3) 
where  is Y2  is a dummy variable showing whether outcome  is Y 1  is observed or 
not. According to equation (3),  is Y2  is determined by an indicator function 
that depends on a set of observed exogenous variables  i X2  and an unob-
served component  is v , which is independent of  i X2 . Under the assumption 
that  () is is v , ε  has zero mean and unit variance bivariate normal distribution 
) , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 ( s ρ Φ , parameters () s s s ρ δ β , ,  can be simultaneously and efficiently 
estimated by MLE.
18 Importantly, selection is irrelevant for the estimation of 
equation (2) if the unobserved factors are uncorrelated ( 0 = s ρ ). In this case, 
s β  can be estimated by probit disregarding the selection equation (3). 
The probit model with sample selection (2)–(3), also known as the 
Heckman probit, is well identified if there is at least one factor determining 
selection but not outcome, that is, if  i X2 contains at least one variable that is 
not in  i X1 . Otherwise, the set-up owes identification solely to the nonline-
arities in the probit models (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Coming up with sound exclusion restrictions, with defensible identifica-
tion based on observables, is often difficult, and it seems to also be problem-
atic in the case at hand. Firstly, any of the available variables, such as compe-
tition intensity or pay structure that we suggest might be related to the asym-
metric speed of wage response may also be regarded as a potential explana-
tory variable for how likely it is that wages will be adjusted upwards and 
downwards, or, indeed, whether they will be adjusted in response to the 
shocks under consideration at all, the issue of selection. And conversely, it is 
very difficult to see why any of the variables that are observed and contain 
information about the propensity to change wages in response to shocks 
would be void of explanatory power for the asymmetric reaction speed in 
wage adjustment. 
On the other hand, it is not so obvious a priori that  is ε  and  is v  are corre-
lated, and thus that selection actually matters for the estimation of equation 
                                                 
18 In Stata, model (2)–(3) can be estimated by heckprob. 29
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(2). Consider, for example, the unobserved component in selection equation 
(3). By construction,  is v  is larger for firms that are more likely to respond to 
shocks by adjusting wages, upward or downward. There may be many differ-
ent factors behind this term, but it seems reasonable to expect that particu-
larly relevant are the magnitude of shocks that different respondents had in 
mind when answering the survey questions, and considerations of downward 
wage rigidity. Thus, everything else being the same, relatively large  is v ’s 
should be associated with those respondents who thought about large rather 
than small shocks and/or those companies for which downward wage rigidity 
is relatively unimportant. To be more precise about the latter, we might even 
consider various theoretical explanations for wage rigidity and the suggested 
socio-economic mechanisms that are said to cause it, and assume that large 
is v ’s correspond to firms that lack the characteristics associated with wage 
rigidity. Yet even such a more structured view of  is v  does not imply that  is v  
and  is ε  should be related in some particular way. Theoretical explanations of 
wage rigidity are silent about whether or why there could be asymmetry in 
the speed of wage adjustments, depending on the type of shock and its direc-
tion. And typically we would not think that the magnitude of shocks should 
matter in this regard either. 
In short, judging from the questionnaire design and the way our survey 
data on wage adjustment to shocks were collected, it seems natural to consid-
er our empirical analysis in the framework of a probit model with selection 
(2)–(3). The issue of whether or not selection is relevant for the estimation is 
an empirical one; we do not have strong grounds to expect that selection 
actually matters. Nor do we have a set of sound exclusion restrictions to en-
sure that the model with selection is structurally identified. In our empirical 
analysis, therefore, we will rely upon a “technical identification” that is based 
on the intrinsic non-linearities of the probits in (2)–(3).  
In empirical applications, however, estimation without exclusion restric-
tions may be problematic, because most of the non-linearity for identification 
arises in the tails of the normal distribution underlying the model (2)–(3). To 
address this problem, we follow the idea proposed by Klein and Vella (2009), 
albeit in a different setting, that identification without exclusion restrictions 
can be aided by exploiting heteroscedasticity in the selection equation, equa-
tion (3) in our case. The crux of their insight is that, once the probit selection 
equation is normalised to account for heteroscedasticity in its random term, 
the resulting normalised regressors are usually linearly independent of the 
original explanatory variables; Klein and Vella (2009) show that this property 
can be exploited in identification.  
We note, however, that in the context of our analysis, the idea of a possi-
bly heteroscedastic unobserved component in equation (3) is appealing not 30
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only because such heteroscedasticity might help with model identification. 
There are other good reasons for suspecting heteroscedasticity in this part of 
the model as well. Our sample, for instance, includes data from three differ-
ent surveys which may differ in the amount of intrinsic uncertainty contained 
in their answers. A similar argument may also be brought up about firms 
from different economic sectors. And of course, there can be other, subtler 
reasons causing a heteroscedastic unobserved component as well. 
Our empirical strategy for making use of the idea of Klein and Vella 
(2009) is as follows. First, we forgo the previous assumption that  is v  has con-
stant variance and assume instead that its variance is a function of the ex-




2 exp s i is X γ σ = , where 
2
is σ  is the variance of  is v  and  s i X γ 3  is a linear 
index of exogenous regressors. The latter may include all elements of  i X2  
except for the constant. As a result, the selection equation (3) becomes:  
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= . Ignoring, for a moment, that 
is ε  and  is v ~  may be correlated, equation (3’) represents a heteroscedastic 
probit model which can be estimated by MLE.
19 However, once we combine 
equation (3’) with the outcome equation (2) and allow for correlation be-
tween  is ε  and  is v ~ , the model becomes non-standard. To estimate it, we adopt 
the two-step procedure considered by Van de Ven and Praag (1981). 
Following Heckman (1979), Van de Ven and Praag (1981) show that 
ignoring selection in (2)–(3) and estimating (2) as a standard probit model 
amounts to an omitted variable specification error. To correct for it, equation 
(2) needs to be amended by an extra regressor, the inverse Mills ratio: 
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− =  and () 0 1 | ~
2 = = is is Y E ε .
20 The random 
term in (4) is heteroscedastic, however, since 
() () is is is is is is A Y E λ λ ρ τ ε − + = = =
2 2
2
2 1 1 | ~ . After normalising equation (4) with 
respect to  is τ , we obtain the final specification, which resembles a standard 
probit:  
                                                 
19 In Stata, this model can be estimated by hetprob.  
20  () ⋅ ϕ  is standard normal density. 
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 were known, model (4’) could be estimated by standard 
probit. However, as  is λ  and  is τ  are not readily available, we follow Van de 
Ven and Praag (1981) and estimate (4’) in several steps. First, we estimate 
the heteroscedastic probit model (3’) by MLE and obtain estimates for the 
inverse Mills ratio  ( ) is is A ˆ ˆ λ . Next, we use them as regressors in equation (4), 
which we estimate by OLS. That is, we apply a linear probability model to 
obtain a consistent estimate ρ ˆ , which enables us to compute  is τˆ .  Finally, we 











, and estimate (4’) by probit. 
The main difference between the estimation procedure just described and 
that considered by Van de Ven and Praag (1981) concerns the first step, 
namely the specification and estimation of model (3’). Van de Ven and Praag 
assumed that  is v  was homoscedastic and estimated the resulting model by 
probit. In contrast, we allow for the possibility that  is v  is heteroscedastic and 
estimate model (3’) as a heteroscedastic probit. As explained above, we make 
this deviation from the original estimation procedure to make use of Klein 
and Vella’s (2009) insight that, in the presence of heteroscedasticity, the nor-
malisation inherent in (3’) introduces additional non-linearities that may aid 
identification.  
When exclusion restrictions are absent, meaning  i i X X 2 1 = , a usual prob-











=  is near-linear 
over a wide range of its argument, s i X δ 2 , and that tends to make  is λ  strongly 













=  in (3’), typically make  i X2  and  is X2
~
 
linearly independent. If so, the same heteroscedasticity-related normalisation 
should enhance identification of the probit with selection set-up by reducing 
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6.2. Estimation results: separate regressions for each type  
of shocks 
 
We estimate separate regressions on each variable, i.e. on the asymmetric 
reaction speed to shocks in sales turnover, product price, labour productivity 
and competitors’ wage level. The regression results are presented in Appen-
dix 8, Tables A8.1.–A8.4.  Estimates of the probit regression are shown in the 
first column, followed by the estimates of the two types of selection model, 
the unadjusted Heckman probit and the heteroscedasticity-adjusted Heckman 
probit regressions (the latter are referred to as modified Heckman regressions 
in Appendix 8). The unadjusted Heckman probit regressions are estimated 
without exclusion restrictions, so the identification is based solely on func-
tional form assumptions. 
We use two tests to assess the correlation between the residuals of the se-
lection and structural equations. For the unadjusted Heckman probit regres-
sions we use the Wald test (the related Chi-square statistics are reported at 
the end of the second column in Tables A8.1.–A8.4.). For the heteroscedas-
ticity-adjusted Heckman probit regressions we use the t-test to assess the 
significance of the “rho”, i.e. the term that corrects for the selection bias in 
the two-step estimation (reported at the end of the third column in Tables 
A8.1.–A8.4.). In all the regression specifications that we estimate, the esti-
mated coefficients for the “rho” are not significantly different from zero. The 
Chi-square statistics for the Wald test for the unadjusted Heckman probit re-
gressions are also mostly in the range where the null hypothesis of no corre-
lation between the unobserved factors is not rejected (it is rejected only in 
one regression out of four). Consequently, the statistical tests do not support 
the existence of the selection effects. Furthermore, a comparison of the esti-
mates from the probit and selection models shows that the estimated marginal 
effects are quite similar across the different methods. This implies that selec-
tion does not cause significant biases and that we can mostly trust the probit 
estimations.  
We also use the likelihood-ratio test of the existence of heteroscedasticity 
in the selection equation to validate the use of the heteroscedasticity-adjusted 
Heckman probit model, since the identification in this case is based on the 
assumption that the residuals are heteroscedastic. The test is based on a Chi-
square statistic, the estimated values for which are presented at the end of the 
last column in Tables A8.1.–A8.4. The test results strongly suggest the pres-
ence of heteroscedasticity in all estimated regressions. 33
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21 The measure of competition is based on company managers’ perception. 
The estimated results exhibit strong similarities among the first three sets 
of regression estimates, where the dependent variables are constructed using 
shocks in sales turnover, product price, and labour productivity. The results 
are different, however, for asymmetry associated with a shock to competi-
tors’ wages. This is an expected result since, as we discussed in the introduc-
tion, the underlying cause of the asymmetric reaction speed is different for 
the last variable.
 For the first three variables listed, the asymmetric nature of 
the response has a positive impact on profits because it is profitable from a 
company’s point of view to delay wage increases as long as possible and to 
implement wage cuts promptly, ceteris paribus. No similar profitability-based 
rationale can be used to explain the asymmetry in response to changes in 
competitors’ wage level. Faced with shocks to this variable, companies react 
faster to increases than to decreases, which could potentially have an adverse 
effect on the profit margin. Rather than stemming from the reason suggested 
above, this pattern in wage setting may arise because of the tendency to pay 
efficiency wages.  
 
 
6.2.1. Asymmetric reaction to shocks in turnover, price and 
productivity 
 
We begin by describing the regression results on the three first variables. 
Our estimations indicate that the propensity for asymmetric reaction is posi-
tively related with product market competition.
21 The estimated effects are 
significantly positive for the dummy of severe competition across all regres-
sion specifications. As we discussed before, companies may react to shocks 
asymmetrically since it allows them to stretch the margins. Thus, a possible 
explanation for this finding is that competition increases the pressure on 
companies to use all possible means of increasing the profit margins, includ-
ing the tendency to react asymmetrically. 
The propensity for asymmetric reaction is affected by production technol-
ogy. The estimated marginal effects for the set of dummy variables measur-
ing the share of labour costs in total costs are positive, and increasing with 
the level of this variable for two of the three shocks, sales turnover and prod-
uct price. This implies that companies which employ more labour-intensive 
technologies have a higher tendency to react asymmetrically. A likely expla-
nation for this relationship is also that asymmetric reaction speed enhances a 
company’s profit margins. The higher the share of labour costs in total costs, 
the stronger the positive effect on profits that firms can achieve by delaying 
wage increases as long as possible and implementing wage cuts as promptly 
as possible in response to shocks.  34
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The regressions also include fixed effects for the separate surveys, which 
control for the differences in the macroeconomic environment and the survey 
method. The estimated effects indicate that the asymmetric reaction was 
more pronounced in 2009 than in 2007 or in 2005, which shows that compa-
nies are more prone to react asymmetrically in a recession. The difference 
between the 2005 and 2009 surveys can also stem from the way the surveys 
were conducted, as the 2005 survey was carried out by telephone interviews 
whereas the 2009 survey was based on internet questionnaires.  
There are other significant results in the regressions but they are not pre-
sent for all three variables and in general not as robust as the results described 
above. Therefore we discuss the additional significant estimates only selec-
tively.   
We find that firm size, which is measured in terms of employment, is neg-
atively related to the propensity for asymmetric reaction in the case of shocks 
to labour productivity. An explanation for this finding could be that in small 
companies wage changes are more likely to take place on an ad hoc basis, 
whereas in large companies it is more probable that wage setting is based on 
formally defined procedures, and this lessens the possibility of asymmetric 
reaction. We do not have a good explanation, though, why it is significant 
only in regressions on productivity shocks. 
We also investigate the relationship between collective bargaining and 
asymmetric behaviour. For the reasons outlined in the third section, this rela-
tionship should be negative. Collectively bargained wage contracts would 
lower a company’s ability to choose the reaction speed in response to shocks 
for two main reasons. First, collectively bargained contracts fix wages for a 
specific, usually pre-defined, time period, which is less likely to be the case 
with individual bargaining. Second, collective bargaining is usually asso-
ciated with greater rigidity in wage setting. The estimated relationship is 
mostly not significantly different from zero, and it is negative only in the 
Heckman probit regression where the dependent variable is a sales turnover 
shock. (In the case of this particular regression the Chi-square statistic is 
significantly different from zero.) The insignificance of this result may be 
caused by the small number of observations, as only around 7% of the sam-
pled companies have collective agreements.  
The estimated relationship between state-dependent (as opposed to time-
dependent) wage setting rules and asymmetric behaviour is insignificant, 
which is an unexpected result. We expected that the use of state-dependent 
wage setting would be positively related with the tendency to react asymme-
trically, since it gives companies more flexibility in choosing the reaction 
speed.  35
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The regression results indicate that the share of bonuses in total pay is in-
significantly related to the tendency to react asymmetrically to shocks in 
turnover and prices, whereas the estimated marginal effect is negative for 
labour productivity shocks. A possible explanation for this result is that the 
changes in bonuses paid are usually directly related to productivity changes 
— the relationship between productivity and the level of bonus payments is 
usually explicitly formulated in the wage contract. Consequently, companies 
who pay bonuses have to treat increases and decreases in productivity sym-
metrically, i.e. they cannot alter the timing of the payment of bonuses more in 
response to positive than to negative shocks in this variable. 
 
 
6.2.2. Asymmetric reaction to shocks in competitors’ wages  
 
As discussed earlier, a possible reason for an asymmetric reaction in the 
case of shocks to competitors’ wages is that companies are paying efficiency 
wages. This would cause them to react slowly to decreases and promptly to 
increases in the external wage level. The validity of this hypothesis can be 
assessed indirectly in the regression context by looking at the relationship be-
tween some firm characteristics and the tendency to react asymmetrically to 
this type of shock. Research on this topic has shown that the payment of effi-
ciency wages is more likely in companies which are larger, use more capital-
intensive production technology and/or hire high-skilled workers. An addi-
tional firm characteristic, which may be associated with the payment of effi-
ciency wages, is remuneration on a piece-rate basis. One of the reasons why 
efficiency wages are paid is that monitoring workers’ effort is costly. Since 
the evaluation of labour productivity is costless when employees are remune-
rated on a piece-rate basis, we can expect this type of remuneration to be as-
sociated with a lower tendency to pay efficiency wages.   
The regression estimates are presented in Table A8.4 in Appendix 8. Only 
one of the company characteristics proposed here are significantly related 
with the propensity to react asymmetrically ʊ the dummy variable of piece-
rate remuneration has a significantly negative coefficient. This supports our 
hypothesis that an asymmetric reaction to a competitors’ wage shock is 
caused by the payment of efficiency wages, but the support is not very ro-
bust.   
Since we are not able to find much evidence in favour of the hypothesis 
that the asymmetric reaction speed to changes in competitors’ wages is 
caused by the payment of efficiency wages, it leaves open the question of 36
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what is causing the asymmetric behaviour in response to shocks in this varia-
ble. It is possible that the insignificance of the results described above is 
caused by insufficient sample size. The variable measuring the speed of re-
sponse to shocks in competitors’ wages is not available in the first of the 
three surveys and the asymmetry is less pronounced than for other variables, 
i.e. a smaller proportion of companies react asymmetrically in response to 
shocks to competitors’ wages. Consequently, the number of companies for 
which the dummy dependent variable in these regressions is equal to one is 
relatively small ʊ in the range of 50 observations (see Table A7.4 in Appen-
dix 7 for details of sample size). Most of the estimated marginal effects are 
insignificant for this variable, with only a few exceptions. 
One of the exceptions was described above ʊ the estimated effect is sig-
nificantly negative for the piece-rate remuneration dummy. The second ex-
ception is the estimate for the fixed effect of the 2007 survey, which is signif-
icantly positive for all estimated model specifications. This indicates that 
firms were more likely to react asymmetrically in response to changes in 
competitors’ wages in 2007, when the labour market was tight. As we dis-
cussed in Section 5, it shows that adverse labour market conditions enhance 
the asymmetry.  
 
 
6.2.3. Estimated effects for selection equations  
 
The estimations for the selection equations of the unadjusted and hetero-
scedasticity-adjusted Heckman probit models are presented in the two last 
columns of Tables A8.1.–A8.4. in Appendix 8. The selection equation esti-
mates the propensity of companies to react to shocks, both increases and de-
creases, in a given variable by changing wages. Since we have no compelling 
reasons to expect that these results should differ between estimations for the 
competitors’ wage shock and the other three shocks (in contrast to the struc-
tural equations) we discuss the estimation results for all four variables simul-
taneously.  
The regression results imply that the propensity to react to shocks is posi-
tively related with the frequency of wage changes, which is an expected re-
sult.
22 The estimated marginal effects for the set of dummy variables meas-
uring wage change frequency are significantly positive and increase monoto-
nically with the level of frequency in most of the estimated selection equa-
tions.   
                                                 
22 The measures of frequency apply to changes in base wages, whereas the propensity to 
change wages in response to shocks applies to the total wage bill. Even so, the two variables 
should be positively related, since not all companies apply flexible payment methods. 37
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Our estimations indicate that the likelihood of reaction is positively related 
with the share of bonuses in total pay and with use of the piece-rate remuner-
ation method. The estimated effects are significant for three variables out of 
the four, for shocks in sales turnover, output price and labour productivity. 
These estimation results confirm our expectations. As indicated by numerous 
previous studies on this topic, fixed base wages tend to be rigid (e.g. Babecký 
et al., 2010). Therefore the use of flexible payment methods, such as the pay-
ment of bonuses or remuneration on a piece-rate basis, makes it more likely 
that companies can react to economic shocks by altering wages.  
In addition to these findings, the regression results imply that manufac-
turing sector businesses are less likely to react to shocks by altering wages 
than companies operating in other sectors. The capital intensity of production 
technology also matters, as more labour-intensive companies are more likely 
to react to shocks.
23 Across the years, the reaction was most likely to be ob-
served in 2009 and least likely in 2005.  
The estimated effects for firm size are not uniform. We find that size is 
positively related with the propensity to react in response to productivity and 




6.3. Estimation results: combined variable of asymmetric 
reaction 
 
Next, we estimate regressions where the dependent variable indicating 
asymmetric reaction speed is created using the combined reaction to three 
different types of shock (i.e. shocks to sales turnover, labour productivity, 
and output price). The regression estimates are presented in Appendix 9. It is 
a dummy which equals one if a company reacts asymmetrically to a shock in 
at least one of these variables. We opted to construct the combined measure 
of asymmetric reaction using three rather than four variables, since the 
reasons behind the asymmetric behaviour are different for the fourth variable 
(shocks to competitors’ wages). 
The main advantage of using a combined measure, rather than estimating 
separate regressions for each type of shock, is that it enlarges the sample used 
in the estimations. The implications of these regressions are similar to those 
already described, but the significance of the estimated effects is stronger. In 
particular, this applies to our measure of competition. We obtain significant 
estimates for marginal effects for the dummy variables of strong and severe 
                                                 
23 The estimated effects for the related dummy variables are significant for three variables 
only, they are not significant for competitors’ wage shocks. 38
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competition in all regression specifications, whereas they were significant 
only for the severe competition dummy in the regressions for separate 
shocks. The estimated marginal effects increase with the level of competition.  
The regression estimates imply that firm size is negatively related with the 
tendency to react asymmetrically. With separate regressions for each shock, 
this relationship was only present for one variable out of the three, the pro-
ductivity shock. We also find that companies in the construction sector are 
more likely to react asymmetrically than manufacturing companies and 




7. Conclusions  
 
There is a substantial body of literature on asymmetries in the dynamics of 
prices. One of its key findings is that the pass-through of cost increases to 
prices is both stronger and faster than that of cost decreases. Another general 
tendency is that, conditional on price adjustment, the opposite pattern pre-
vails in the speed of price responses to demand shocks. We demonstrate that 
similar asymmetries are characteristic of wages as well: at the level of the 
firm, the speed and incidence of wage adjustments depend on the type and 
direction of shocks. Our evidence on the asymmetric incidence of wage 
changes conforms to downward nominal wage rigidity, but the findings on 
asymmetries in the speed of wage adjustment are novel.   
We find that the speed of wage adjustment is asymmetric: firms react 
faster to negative than to positive shocks. The main focus of our analysis is 
on detecting the possible reasons for this behaviour. For this purpose, we 
employ the probit and Heckman probit models. The standard Heckman selec-
tion model can be identified using exclusion restrictions, i.e. a variable or a 
set of variables which enter the selection equation but are not included in the 
structural equation. When exclusion restrictions are not available the model 
can be identified using the assumption of the joint normality of regression 
residuals. However, this may result in poor identification and high multicol-
linearity in the structural equation, since normal cumulative probability func-
tion is nearly linear for a large range of values and exhibits nonlinearities 
only in the tails. 
The set of variables that are available to us does not contain good candi-
dates for exclusion restrictions. Thus, we take a different path and exploit 
heteroscedasticity in the binary selection equation for identification of the 
structural model. The derivation of this methodology, which we labelled the 
modified Heckman probit model, is discussed in detail in Section 6.  39
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The estimation results of the three alternative models — the probit, stand-
ard and modified Heckman probit models — imply that selection does not 
pose a major problem in the empirical estimation, and our main findings hold 
regardless of whether we model selection explicitly or not.  
For turnover, output price and productivity shocks, our estimation results 
imply that the speed asymmetry in wage adjustment is positively associated 
with product market competition and the labour intensity of production tech-
nology. Both of these findings support the hypothesis that this particular 
asymmetry results from firms’ attempts to protect profit margins. 
For shocks to competitors’ wages, we hypothesised that asymmetric wage 
adjustments result from the payment of efficiency wages. Consequently, we 
anticipated that the incidence of this asymmetry would co-vary with firm 
size, capital intensity, the share of skilled labour and piece-rate remuneration 
— available firm-level characteristics that could be expected to correlate with 
firms’ propensity to pay efficiency wages. Of these, however, the only co-
variate we found to be related to the asymmetry — negatively, as expected — 
was the dummy variable for piece-rate remuneration. Hence, although our es-
timation results do not make the efficiency wage-based explanation look 
implausible, their indirect support for this hypothesis is insufficient. We con-
clude that the underlying reasons for this asymmetry remain largely unclear. 
Our results offer a more refined picture of nominal wage rigidity at the 
microeconomic level. Thanks to the advantages provided by survey data, we 
have been able to focus on issues that are otherwise difficult to pin down 
such as the connection between the nature and direction of a disturbance 
causing a wage change and the time lag until the change is implemented. It is 
unlikely that the speed asymmetry thus uncovered is due to information lags, 
in the sense that the direction of a shock means it systematically takes more 
or less time for a firm to learn about its nature — whether the shock is 
permanent or temporary, how large the shock is, and so forth. Rather, some 
firms actively use the implementation lags as choice variables when adjusting 
to shocks. This behaviour is intrinsically state-dependent and the underlying 
differences in the implementation lags are certainly non-trivial: given how 
the speed of wage adjustment is measured by our survey (see Appendix 2), 
the reaction speeds differ by at least a factor of two. It would be interesting to 
see if the speed asymmetry in wage setting could also be detected using 
matched employee-employer panel datasets. 
It is also natural to ask what economic significance the speed asymmetry 
in wage adjustment might have at the macroeconomic level. In the context of 
DSGE models, similar questions concerning downward nominal wage rigid-
ity (DNWR) have recently been investigated by Kim and Ruge-Murcia 
(2009a, 2009b) and Fahr and Smets (2010). To extend the framework for 40
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conducting analogous analysis to speed asymmetry however, it would be 
necessary to model wage rigidity in a more refined manner than has been 
done in the existing studies. First, the models should make a meaningful 
distinction between the incidence and the speed of wage adjustment, both of 
which would in addition have to permit asymmetries — DNWR and the 
speed asymmetry, respectively. Currently, the two most commonly used 
mechanisms for modelling nominal frictions, those proposed by Rotemberg 
(1982) and Calvo (1983), make no such distinction as both rely on a single 
model parameter to characterise wage setting. The linex function that Kim 
and Ruge-Murcia (2009a, 2009b) and Fahr and Smets (2010) use to account 
for DNWR generalises Rotemberg’s mechanism by introducing an additional 
parameter that controls the degree of asymmetry in wage adjustment costs. 
To allow for the speed asymmetry in addition to DNWR, however, it would 
be necessary to modify the underlying micro-foundations of wage setting in 
more fundamental ways.             
The second insight from the current study that could be useful for macro 
modelling is that the nature of speed asymmetry in wage adjustment depends 
on the type of shock. For some disturbances, the direction in which this 
asymmetry affects wage flexibility coincides with that of DNWR, but for 
other shocks, the two work in opposite directions. This also suggests that, in 
comparison to the modelling of DNWR with the help of the linex function, 
accounting for the speed asymmetry would require more substantial modifi-
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Appendix 1: Stratification and sample structure 
 














 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
A: 2005 Survey    
Sector:
2          
  Manufacturing    89   35.6    46.6    24.5    40.2 
  Construction    33   13.2    10.5    14.9    10.9 
  Trade    52   20.8       9.6    27.5    20.0 
  Market serv.    76   30.4    33.4    33.0    28.9 
 Total  250  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Size:            
  5–19  107    42.8       6.9    72.9    24.8 
  20–49    52    20.8       9.9    17.5    19.9 
  50–99    51    20.4    22.0      8.1    28.3 
  100 and more    40    16.0    61.2      1.4    27.0 
 Total  250  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
B: 2007 Survey   
Sector:            
  Manufacturing  177    40.7    44.5    24.5    40.2 
  Construction    60    13.8      7.3    14.9    10.9 
  Trade    80    18.4    15.1    27.5    20.0 
  Market serv.  118    27.1    33.2    33.0    28.9 
 Total
3  435 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Size:             
  5–19  114    26.2      2.9    72.9    24.8 
  20–49  110    25.3      8.2    17.5    19.9 
  50–99    97    22.3    16.2      8.1    28.3 
  100 and more  114    26.2    72.8      1.4    27.0 
 Total
3  435 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
C: 2009 Survey   
Sector:            
  Manufacturing  184    32.5    38.5    24.5    40.2 
  Construction    87    15.3      9.3    14.9    10.9 
  Trade  116    20.5    21.1    27.5    20.0 
  Market serv.  180    31.7    31.2    33.0    28.9 
 Total  567  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Size:          
  5–19  176    31.0      4.6    72.9    24.8 
  20–49  150    26.5    11.4    17.5    19.9 
  50–99  120    21.2     19.7      8.1    28.3 
  100 and more  121    21.3    64.3      1.4    27.0 
 Total  567  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
D: Pooled data   
Sector:          
  Manufacturing  450    35.9    42.3    24.5    40.2 
  Construction  180    14.4      8.6    14.9    10.9 
  Trade  248    19.8    16.8    27.5    20.0 44
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 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Market serv.  374    29.9    32.3    33.0    28.9 
  Total    1252  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Size:          
  5–19  397    31.7      4.2    72.9    24.8 
  20–49  312    24.9      9.8    17.5    19.9 
  50–99  268    21.4    18.6      8.1    14.3 
  100 and more  275    22.0    67.4      1.4    41.0 
 Total    1252  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Notes:   
(1) Information on the target population is based on the Estonian business registry for 2005. 
(2) Thirteen companies that were attributed to the primary sector in the original data file are now 
included in manufacturing.     
(3) The total number of observations is 435 rather than 439, because there are four companies in 
the 2007 survey for which information on either sector (1 company) or employment (3 companies) 
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Appendix 2: Description of the survey question on 
reaction speed to shocks 
 
Reaction speed to shocks 
 
How quickly do the changes listed below influence the wage payments (including 
paid bonuses) of the employees in the main occupational group (as defined in 
question 2.1)? 
















Increase in turnover  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ 
Decrease in turnover  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ 
Increase in the price 
of your main 
product/service 
Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ 
Decrease in the price 
of your main 
product/service 








Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ 
Increase in 
competitors’ wages  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ 
Decrease in 
competitors’ wages  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ 
Increase in inflation   Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ 
Decrease in inflation  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ 
Increase in 
unemployment  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ  Ƒ 
Decrease in 
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Definition of the main occupational group 
 
2.1.A – How were your firm’s employees distributed across the following 
occupational groups at the end of the last economic year? 
Low skilled blue collar/Production   ____% 
High skilled blue collar/Technical  ____% 
Low skilled white collar/Clerical  ____% 
High skilled white collar/Professional  ____% 
Other (please specify) 
 ____________________________________________  ____% 
TOTAL ( = 100%)  100  % 
ONE GROUP HAS THE LARGEST SHARE OF WORKERS: 
According to your answer, the main (i.e. the most numerous) occupational group in 
your firm is …
ĺ GO TO QUESTION 2.2 
TWO (OR MORE) GROUPS HAVE EQUAL SHARES OF WORKERS: 
2.1.B – What is the main occupational group in your firm?  
Please choose only one option
Low skilled blue collar/Production   Ƒ 
High skilled blue collar/Technical  Ƒ 
Low skilled white collar/Clerical  Ƒ 
High skilled white collar/Professional  Ƒ 
Other (please specify) 
_______________________________________________  Ƒ 
 
 
Definition of the main product or service 
 
“If your firm produces (or sells) more than one single good or service, the answers 
must refer to the ‘main product or service’, defined as the one that generated the 
highest fraction of your firm’s revenue in the last economic year.” 
Source: firm level data from the Amadeus database, Estonian Commercial Register and Latvian 
Commercial Register. 47
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Appendix 4: Asymmetric reaction speed to shocks  
Share of businesses that react to a negative shock faster, slower or with the same 












Sales turnover  0.071  0.903  0.025  1.7  120 
Product price  0.034  0.930  0.035  0.0    70 












Sales turnover  0.162  0.801  0.037  4.9  267 
Product price  0.167  0.806  0.028  5.4  248 
Labour productivity  0.096  0.844  0.059  1.8  354 
Competitors’ wage  0.138  0.852 0.010 5.9  277 
Inflation* 0.029  0.951  0.021  0.6  247 












Sales turnover  0.288  0.691  0.021  11.6  422 
Product price  0.174  0.799  0.028    6.7  361 
Labour productivity  0.176  0.761  0.063    5.3  439 
Competitors’ wage  0.078  0.886  0.037    2.3  327 
Inflation*  0.029  0.950  0.021    0.6  294 
Unemployment  0.040  0.924  0.036    0.3  293 
Notes: Negative shocks are a decrease in sales turnover, product price, labour productivity and 
unemployment; and an increase in the wage levels of competitors. Figures are employment-
weighted 
* We do not associate the direction of change with the nature of the shock in the case of inflation. 
The figures presented here show the proportion of firms who react faster, similarly or slower to 
an increase in this variable. 49
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Appendix 5: Asymmetric reaction probability to shocks 
 









Sales turnover  0.646  0.470  4.0  250 
Product price  0.329  0.263  1.6  250 









Sales turnover  0.703  0.615  2.8  435 
Product price  0.658  0.549  3.3  435 
Labour productivity  0.893  0.817  3.2  435 
Competitors’ wage   0.886 0.633  9.1 435 
Inflation 0.770  0.551  7.0  435 









Sales turnover  0.812  0.846  –1.5  529 
Product price  0.709  0.748  –1.4  510 
Labour productivity  0.923  0.916    0.4  498 
Competitors’ wage   0.752  0.704    1.7  478 
Inflation  0.714  0.637    2.5  460 
Unemployment 0.659  0.677  –0.6  460 
Notes: Figures are employment-weighted. 50
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within 1 month within 3 months within 6 months within a year or more
 
 
Notes: The 2005 survey included the related questions for three variables: sales turnover, product 
price and labour productivity. The two following surveys also included questions for competitors’ 
wages, inflation and unemployment. Figures are employment-weighted. 52
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Appendix 7: Differences in unconditional sample means: 
firms that react asymmetrically vs. other companies  















Main occupational group            
Low-skilled blue collar  0.253  0.240 182  629    0.351  811 
High-skilled blue collar  0.555 0.563  182  629 –0.188  811 
Low-skilled white collar  0.066  0.100 182  629 –1.404  811 
High-skilled white collar  0.126  0.097 182  629    1.146  811 
Sector           
Manufacturing, etc  0.302  0.315  182  628  –0.335  810 
Construction  0.203  0.132  182  628    2.384  810 
Trade 0.154  0.240  182  628  –2.486  810 
Services  0.341  0.312  182  628    0.727  810 
Level of competition           
No/marginal competition  0.063  0.114 176  603 –1.999  779 
Average competition  0.455  0.534  176  603  –1.857  779 
Severe competition   0.483  0.352  176  603    3.174  779 
Size           
20 or less employees  0.365  0.336  181  628    0.715  809 
21–100 employees  0.464  0.467  181  628  –0.059  809 
101 or more employees  0.171  0.197  181  628  –0.788  809 
Share of labour costs in total costs          
Up to 10%  0.052  0.109  174  587  –2.259  761 
11–25% 0.247  0.332  174  587  –2.129  761 
26–50%  0.489  0.388  174  587    2.362  761 
51–100%  0.213  0.170  174  587    1.275  761 
Remuneration           
Hourly wage  0.369  0.289  176  588    2.025  764 
Piece-rate wage  0.250  0.260  176  588  –0.271  764 
Monthly wage  0.381  0.451  176  588  –1.644  764 
Wage change frequency           
More than once a year  0.163  0.162  172  575    0.033  747 
Once a year  0.622  0.603  172  575    0.438  747 
Less than once a year  0.215 0.235  172  575  –0.537 747 
State-dependent wage 
setting 0.434  0.480  182  629  –1.096  811 
Bonus   0.722  0.741  180  615  –0.515  795 
Collective agreement  0.066  0.083  182  629  –0.737  811 
Survey year           
2005 0.055  0.175  182  629  –4.049  811 
2007 0.242  0.358  182  629  –2.938  811 
2009  0.703  0.467  182  629    5.715  811 53
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Main occupational group           
Low-skilled blue collar  0.248 0.273  109  572 –0.539 681 
High-skilled blue collar  0.587 0.552  109  572    0.668  681 
Low-skilled white collar  0.055  0.077 109  572 –0.802 681 
High-skilled white collar  0.110  0.098 109  572    0.389  681 
Sector          
Manufacturing, etc  0.312  0.326  109  571  –0.282  680 
Construction  0.275  0.159  109  571    2.912  680 
Trade 0.101  0.205  109  571  –2.553  680 
Services  0.312  0.310  109  571    0.040  680 
Level of competition          
No/marginal competition  0.046  0.102 108  550 –1.821 658 
Average competition  0.472  0.527  108  550  –1.046  658 
Severe competition   0.481  0.371  108  550    2.159  658 
20 or less employees  0.306  0.349  108  571  –0.862  679 
21–100 employees  0.519  0.468  108  571    0.971  679 
101 or more employees  0.176  0.184  108  571  –0.196  679 
Share of labour costs in total costs        
Up to 10%  0.066  0.104  106  540  –1.195  646 
11–25% 0.189  0.311  106  540  –2.546  646 
26–50%  0.491  0.407  106  540    1.586  646 
51–100%  0.255  0.178  106  540    1.847  646 
Remuneration          
Hourly wage  0.349  0.323  106  539    0.526  645 
Piece-rate wage  0.264  0.286  106  539  –0.450  645 
Monthly wage  0.387  0.391  106  539  –0.090  645 
Wage change frequency          
More than once a year  0.133  0.175  105  519  –1.048  624 
Once a year  0.648  0.626  105  519    0.414  624 
Less than once a year  0.219  0.198  105  519    0.479  624 
State-dependent wage 
setting 0.459  0.474  109  572  –0.288  681 
Bonus   0.822  0.739  107  559    1.837  666 
Collective agreement  0.092  0.086  109  572    0.206  681 
Survey year          
2005 0.028  0.117  109  572  –2.836  681 
2007 0.367  0.367  109  572  –0.003  681 
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Main occupational group          
Low-skilled blue collar  0.276  0.275 123  799    0.025  922 
High-skilled blue collar  0.528 0.554  123  799 –0.539  922 
Low-skilled white collar  0.081  0.081 123  799 –0.002  922 
High-skilled white collar  0.114  0.089 123  799    0.890  922 
Sector            
Manufacturing, etc  0.374  0.362  123  798    0.254  921 
Construction  0.211  0.155  123  798    1.566  921 
Trade 0.179  0.197  123  798  –0.466  921 
Services 0.236  0.286  123  798  –1.149  921 
Level of competition            
No/marginal 
competition  0.066 0.112  122  767 –1.554  889 
Average competition  0.451  0.524  122  767  –1.505  889 
Severe competition   0.484  0.364  122  767    2.539  889 
20 or less employees  0.390  0.291  123  797    2.228  920 
21–100 employees  0.455  0.476  123  797  –0.418  920 
101 or more employees  0.154  0.233  123  797  –1.959  920 
Share of labour costs in total costs         
Up to 10%  0.085  0.107  118  749  –0.730  867 
11–25% 0.263  0.351  118  749  –1.888  867 
26–50%  0.492  0.383  118  749    2.239  867 
51–100%  0.161  0.159  118  749    0.059  867 
Remuneration            
Hourly wage  0.440  0.310  116  751    2.773  867 
Piece-rate wage  0.224  0.268  116  751  –0.991  867 
Monthly wage  0.336  0.422  116  751  –1.751  867 
Wage change frequency         
More than once a year  0.132  0.158  114  729  –0.719  843 
Once a year  0.649  0.641  114  729    0.176  843 
Less than once a year  0.219  0.202  114  729    0.434  843 
State-dependent wage 
setting  0.496  0.476  123  799    0.420  922 
Bonus   0.754  0.748  122  781    0.150  903 
Collective agreement  0.057  0.096  123  799  –1.416  922 
Survey year            
2005 0.041  0.153  123  799  –3.373  922 
2007 0.301  0.399  123  799  –2.090  922 
2009  0.659  0.448  123  799    4.392  922 
 55
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1340
May 2011
 















Main occupational group           
Low-skilled blue collar  0.238 0.290  63  544 –0.870 607 
High-skilled blue collar  0.667  0.546  63  544    1.829  607 
Low-skilled white collar  0.032 0.064  63  544 –1.023 607 
High-skilled white 
collar 0.063  0.099  63  544  –0.913  607 
Sector          
Manufacturing, etc  0.397  0.326  63  543    1.129  606 
Construction  0.206  0.164  63  543     0.851  606 
Trade 0.127  0.201  63  543  –1.404  606 
Services 0.270  0.309  63  543  –0.644  606 
Level of competition          
No/marginal 
competition 0.048  0.057 63  525  –0.310  588 
Average competition  0.492  0.550  63  525  –0.879  588 
Severe competition   0.460  0.392  63  525    1.039  588 
Size          
20 or less employees  0.206  0.287  63  541  –1.344  604 
21–100 employees  0.524  0.470  63  541    0.816  604 
101 or more employees  0.270  0.244  63  541    0.450  604 
Share of labour costs in total costs          
Up to 10%  0.115  0.108  61  518    0.157  579 
11–25% 0.262  0.311  61  518  –0.777  579 
26–50%  0.426  0.402  61  518    0.371  579 
51–100%  0.197  0.180  61  518    0.329  579 
Remuneration          
Hourly wage  0.373  0.341  59  511    0.495  570 
Piece-rate wage  0.203  0.258  59  511  –0.918  570 
Monthly wage  0.424  0.401  59  511    0.334  570 
Wage change frequency          
More than once a year  0.339  0.145  59  497    3.837  556 
Once a year  0.525  0.662  59  497  –2.080  556 
Less than once a year  0.136 0.193  59  497 –1.071 556 
State-dependent wage 
setting  0.492 0.507  63  544 –0.229 607 
Bonus   0.902  0.787  61  531    2.117  592 
Collective agreement  0.111  0.092  63  544    0.494  607 
Survey year          
2005            
2007  0.619  0.443  63  544    2.665  607 
2009 0.381  0.557  63  544  –2.665  607 
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A7.5: Company reacts asymmetrically to any shock (3 variables) 















Main occupational group            
Low-skilled blue collar  0.269  0.267  271  784    0.089  1055 
High-skilled blue collar  0.554  0.546  271  784    0.216  1055 
Low-skilled white collar  0.066  0.096 271  784  –1.464  1055 
High-skilled white collar  0.111  0.092  271  784    0.905  1055 
Sector          
Manufacturing, etc  0.325  0.369  271  783  –1.313  1054 
Construction  0.225  0.130  271  783    3.742  1054 
Trade 0.151  0.212  271  783  –2.171  1054 
Services  0.299  0.289  271  783    0.320  1054 
Level of competition          
No/marginal competition  0.057  0.132 264  752  –3.329  1016 
Average competition  0.458  0.540  264  752  –2.285  1016 
Severe competition   0.485  0.328  264  752    4.572  1016 
Size          
20 or less employees  0.389  0.304  270  782    2.561  1052 
21–100 employees  0.444  0.464  270  782  –0.561  1052 
101 or more employees  0.167  0.231  270  782  –2.238  1052 
Share of labour costs in total costs          
Up to 10%  0.077  0.109  259  722  –1.476  981 
11–25% 0.266  0.361  259  722  –2.787  981 
26–50%  0.452  0.380  259  722    2.039  981 
51–100%  0.205  0.150  259  722    2.054  981 
Remuneration          
Hourly wage  0.362  0.314  260  732    1.398  992 
Piece-rate wage  0.265  0.251  260  732    0.445  992 
Monthly wage  0.373  0.434  260  732  –1.723  992 
Wage change frequency          
More than once a year  0.152  0.157  256  708  –0.168  964 
Once a year  0.637  0.630  256  708    0.192  964 
Less than once a year  0.211 0.213  256  708 –0.078 964 
State-dependent wage 
setting  0.465 0.489  271  784 –0.669 1055 
Bonus   0.738  0.722  267  766    0.501  1033 
Collective agreement  0.063  0.098  271  784  –1.768  1055 
Survey year          
2005 0.059  0.194  271  784  –5.294  1055 
2007 0.306  0.388  271  784  –2.404  1055 
2009  0.635  0.418  271  784    6.255  1055 
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Appendix 8: Probit and Heckman probit regressions: 
separate regressions for shocks in different variables 
A8.1: Sales turnover shock 
 
    Structural equation  Selection equation 








Main occupational group (Reference group: Low-skilled blue-collar)    
High-skilled blue-collar  0.001  –0.003 –0.002  0.070** 0.060** 
   (0.980)  (0.939)  (0.949)  (0.042)  (0.044) 
Low-skilled white-collar  –0.022  –0.035 –0.021  0.028 0.015 
   (0.745)  (0.568)  (0.692)  (0.632)  (0.840) 
High-skilled white-collar  0.044 0.017  0.032  0.025 0.056 
   (0.529)  (0.798)  (0.579)  (0.682)  (0.314) 
Sector (Reference group: Manufacturing)          
Construction sector  0.087  0.095*  0.075  0.063  0.050 
   (0.122)  (0.062)  (0.137)  (0.166)  (0.193) 
Trade sector  –0.018  0.005  –0.013  0.210***  0.128*** 
   (0.724)  (0.916)  (0.763)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
Services' sector  0.025  0.042  0.020  0.145***  0.043 
   (0.580)  (0.281)  (0.580)  (0.000)  (0.181) 
Competition (Reference group: No/marginal competition)       
Average  competition  0.061  0.063 0.057 0.048  0.101** 
   (0.236)  (0.123)  (0.262)  (0.295)  (0.042) 
Severe competition  0.139**  0.138***  0.129**  0.082*  0.118** 
   (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.033)  (0.090)  (0.018) 
Size (Reference group: 20 or less employees)          
21–100 employees  –0.033  –0.026  –0.029  0.009  0.012 
   (0.396)  (0.452)  (0.338)  (0.789)  (0.624) 
101 or more employees  –0.028  –0.020  –0.027  –0.055  –0.039 
   (0.571)  (0.651)  (0.457)  (0.184)  (0.210) 
Share of labour costs in total costs (Reference group: Up to 10%)     
11–25%  0.069  0.062 0.072 0.050  0.016 
   (0.185)  (0.149)  (0.252)  (0.330)  (0.704) 
26–50% 0.149***  0.154***  0.155**  0.103**  0.072* 
   (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.015)  (0.044)  (0.083) 
51–100% 0.182***  0.178***  0.209**  0.139**  0.097* 
   (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.098) 
Survey year (Reference group: Survey 2009)          
Survey 2005  –0.180*** –0.187*** –0.131*** –0.351***  –0.230***
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Survey 2007  –0.146*** –0.147*** –0.109*** –0.181***  –0.140***
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Wage change frequency (Reference group: lower than annual)    
Higher than annual  0.085  0.052  0.073  0.202***  0.118*** 
   (0.173)  (0.345)  (0.196)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Annual 0.075*  0.076**  0.062*  0.078**  0.030 
   (0.068)  (0.031)  (0.076)  (0.021)  (0.287) 58
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setting  –0.007 –0.012  –0.004  –0.044  –0.009 
   (0.828)  (0.709)  (0.870)  (0.150)  (0.704) 
Remuneration (Reference group: Monthly)          
Piece-rate remuneration  0.049  0.061  0.040  0.126***  0.006 
   (0.334)  (0.159)  (0.342)  (0.000)  (0.855) 
Hourly remuneration  0.045  0.063  0.039  –0.014  –0.013 
   (0.292)  (0.113)  (0.294)  (0.686)  (0.646) 
Bonus (%)  –0.082  –0.042  –0.047  0.214**  0.170*** 
   (0.412)  (0.708)  (0.597)  (0.017)  (0.002) 
Collective agreement  –0.044  –0.090* –0.036  –0.062  –0.030 
   (0.410)  (0.069)  (0.354)  (0.282)  (0.420) 
Rho     0.050    
       (0.604)     
Chi-square statistic    10.25***     51.96*** 
     (0.001)      (0.000) 
Observations 629  921  627  921  921 
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A8.2: Output price shock 
 
    Structural equation  Selection equation 








Main occupational group (Reference group: Low-skilled blue-collar)    
High-skilled blue-collar  0.030 0.030  0.044 –0.055 –0.029 
   (0.424)  (0.385)  (0.341)  (0.124)  (0.396) 
Low-skilled white-collar  0.044  0.048 0.063  –0.048 –0.021 
   (0.564)  (0.545)  (0.521)  (0.428)  (0.763) 
High-skilled white-collar  –0.003 0.000  0.021 –0.070 –0.068 
   (0.959)  (0.996)  (0.807)  (0.268)  (0.369) 
Sector (Reference group: Manufacturing)          
Construction sector  0.112*  0.101*  0.061  0.176***  0.175*** 
   (0.054)  (0.081)  (0.403)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Trade sector  –0.100** –0.094**  –0.135*  0.133***  0.124*** 
   (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.073)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
Services sector  –0.032  –0.024 –0.058  0.095**  0.091** 
   (0.458)  (0.601)  (0.355)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
Competition (Reference group: No/marginal competition)       
Average competition  0.065  0.071  0.080  0.047  0.046 
   (0.192)  (0.110)  (0.306)  (0.344)  (0.438) 
Severe competition  0.102*  0.109**  0.118  0.078  0.078 
   (0.055)  (0.021)  (0.162)  (0.135)  (0.195) 
Size (Reference group: 20 or less employees)       
21–100 employees  0.019  0.019  0.013  –0.007  0.017 
   (0.612)  (0.580)  (0.760)  (0.845)  (0.693) 
101 or more employees  0.018  0.020  0.036  –0.099**  –0.065 
   (0.715)  (0.717)  (0.584)  (0.031)  (0.172) 
Share of labour costs in total costs (Reference group: Up to 10%)     
11–25% 0.035  0.036  0.071  –0.037  0.004 
   (0.412)  (0.368)  (0.421)  (0.519)  (0.944) 
26–50% 0.143*** 0.138***  0.195**  0.056  0.060 
   (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.022)  (0.317)  (0.271) 
51–100% 0.177*** 0.173***  0.226**  0.120*  0.121* 
   (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.027)  (0.062)  (0.054) 
Survey year (Reference group: Survey 2009)       
Survey 2005  –0.127*** –0.097*  –0.051  –0.413***  –0.417***
   (0.001)  (0.062)  (0.583)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Survey 2007  0.006  0.021  0.044  –0.130***  –0.129***
   (0.873)  (0.646)  (0.482)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Wage change frequency (Reference group: lower than annual)    
Higher than annual  –0.067  –0.069  –0.108  0.221***  0.141*** 
   (0.149)  (0.106)  (0.145)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Annual –0.011  –0.002  –0.028  0.138***  0.030 
   (0.797)  (0.964)  (0.587)  (0.000)  (0.545) 
State-dependent wage 
setting  0.011 0.023  0.013 –0.017 –0.029 
   (0.732)  (0.512)  (0.726)  (0.607)  (0.445) 
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Remuneration (Reference group: Monthly) 
Piece-rate remuneration  –0.047  –0.038 –0.066  0.160***  0.097** 
   (0.230)  (0.330)  (0.239)  (0.000)  (0.046) 
Hourly remuneration  –0.051  –0.024  –0.055  0.028  –0.002 
   (0.180)  (0.522)  (0.232)  (0.460)  (0.963) 
Bonus (%)  0.067  0.077  0.032  0.017  0.200 
   (0.514)  (0.440)  (0.796)  (0.841)  (0.185) 
Collective agreement  0.015  –0.025  –0.004  0.048  0.017 
   (0.792)  (0.614)  (0.945)  (0.420)  (0.774) 
Rho     –0.136     
       (0.310)     
Chi-square statistic    0.0912      22.75** 
     (0.763)      (0.019) 
Observations 532  915  532  915  915 
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A8.3: Labour productivity shock 
 
    Structural equation  Selection equation 








Main occupational group (Reference group: Low-skilled blue-collar)    
High-skilled blue-collar  0.006 0.023 0.024  0.071* 0.031 
   (0.845)  (0.437)  (0.530)  (0.050)  (0.210) 
Low-skilled white-collar  0.109  0.121* 0.176* 0.039 –0.015 
   (0.106)  (0.083)  (0.069)  (0.524)  (0.807) 
High-skilled white-collar  0.059 0.046 0.087 0.013 –0.002 
   (0.335)  (0.434)  (0.317)  (0.845)  (0.971) 
Sector (Reference group: Manufacturing)       
Construction sector  0.021  0.012  –0.004  0.084*  0.088** 
   (0.622)  (0.791)  (0.948)  (0.083)  (0.031) 
Trade sector  –0.036  –0.041  –0.039 0.218***  0.014 
   (0.359)  (0.292)  (0.376)  (0.000)  (0.746) 
Services sector  –0.044  –0.041 –0.047  0.137***  0.016 
   (0.188)  (0.248)  (0.241)  (0.001)  (0.562) 
Competition (Reference group: No/marginal competition)    
Average competition  0.040  0.004  0.062  0.047  –0.003 
   (0.291)  (0.930)  (0.281)  (0.333)  (0.939) 
Severe competition  0.079*  0.062  0.086  0.083  0.058 
   (0.058)  (0.193)  (0.184)  (0.101)  (0.183) 
Size (Reference group: 20 or less employees)       
21–100 employees  –0.040  –0.018 –0.060 0.029 0.054* 
   (0.212)  (0.584)  (0.178)  (0.411)  (0.063) 
101 or more employees  –0.089**  –0.088**  –0.106**  –0.049  0.101*** 
   (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.039)  (0.274)  (0.001) 
Share of labour costs in total costs (Reference group: Up to 10%)     
11–25% 0.031  –0.009  0.121  0.039  0.014 
   (0.386)  (0.831)  (0.136)  (0.460)  (0.646) 
26–50% 0.103***  0.082*  0.209**  0.087*  –0.005 
   (0.007)  (0.067)  (0.016)  (0.098)  (0.859) 
51–100% 0.060  0.038  0.183  0.132**  0.020 
   (0.188)  (0.448)  (0.103)  (0.032)  (0.618) 
Survey year (Reference group: Survey 2009)       
Survey 2005  –0.132*** –0.133*** –0.114*** –0.417***  –0.289***
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Survey 2007  –0.081*** –0.090*** –0.067** –0.200***  –0.081***
   (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.035)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Wage change frequency (Reference group: lower than annual)    
Higher than annual  –0.011  0.008  –0.029  0.217***  0.048 
   (0.792)  (0.872)  (0.565)  (0.000)  (0.369) 
Annual 0.013  0.033  –0.002  0.098***  0.033 
   (0.681)  (0.286)  (0.958)  (0.006)  (0.342) 
State-dependent wage 
setting 0.029  0.049  0.019  –0.039  –0.013 
   (0.258)  (0.115)  (0.529)  (0.229)  (0.492) 
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Remuneration (Reference group: Monthly) 
Piece-rate remuneration  0.020  0.043  0.031  0.125***  0.058** 
   (0.618)  (0.323)  (0.549)  (0.002)  (0.021) 
Hourly remuneration  0.064*  0.058  0.092*  –0.026  –0.028 
   (0.082)  (0.135)  (0.058)  (0.493)  (0.286) 
Bonus (%)  –0.181**  –0.129  –0.270*  0.235***  0.156** 
   (0.039)  (0.123)  (0.083)  (0.008)  (0.036) 
Collective agreement  –0.024  –0.032  –0.089*  –0.016  0.043 
   (0.569)  (0.499)  (0.068)  (0.796)  (0.442) 
Rho     –0.105     
       (0.178)     
Chi-square statistic    1.527      90.13*** 
     (0.217)      (0.000) 
Observations 708  844  664  844  904 
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A8.4: Competitors’ wage shock 
 
    Structural equation  Selection equation 








Main occupational group (Reference group: Low-skilled blue-collar)    
High-skilled blue-collar  0.027 0.028 0.022 0.016 –0.021 
   (0.401)  (0.345)  (0.420)  (0.645)  (0.912) 
Low-skilled white-collar  –0.120  –0.085*** –0.064*  –0.066  –0.117 
   (0.127)  (0.000)  (0.077)  (0.245)  (0.589) 
High-skilled white-collar  –0.030 –0.034 –0.019 0.032 0.027 
   (0.623)  (0.402)  (0.695)  (0.563)  (0.770) 
Sector (Reference group: Manufacturing)       
Construction sector  –0.013  –0.011  –0.003  0.147***  0.512 
   (0.761)  (0.825)  (0.944)  (0.007)  (0.844) 
Trade sector  –0.066  –0.043  –0.039  0.097*  0.211*** 
   (0.175)  (0.307)  (0.361)  (0.066)  (0.003) 
Services' sector  –0.029  –0.010  –0.018  0.140***  0.215* 
   (0.458)  (0.783)  (0.638)  (0.001)  (0.087) 
Competition (Reference group: No/marginal competition)    
Average competition  0.039  0.055  0.037  0.081  0.088 
   (0.577)  (0.161)  (0.522)  (0.134)  (0.719) 
Severe competition  0.076  0.052  0.071  0.091*  0.081 
   (0.279)  (0.142)  (0.294)  (0.100)  (0.682) 
Size (Reference group: 20 or less employees)       
21–100 employees  0.032  –0.004  0.029  0.057  0.085 
   (0.391)  (0.918)  (0.352)  (0.185)  (0.581) 
101 or more employees  0.029  –0.000  0.029  0.087**  0.090 
   (0.507)  (0.998)  (0.463)  (0.046)  (0.384) 
Share of labour costs in total costs (Reference group: Up to 10%)     
11–25% –0.029  –0.036  –0.030  –0.006  –0.117** 
   (0.557)  (0.604)  (0.417)  (0.928)  (0.047) 
26–50%  0.011 0.022 0.004 0.041 –0.072 
   (0.818)  (0.737)  (0.929)  (0.518)  (0.577) 
51–100%  0.015 0.008 0.008 0.053 –0.069 
   (0.790)  (0.913)  (0.876)  (0.432)  (0.626) 
Survey year (Reference group: Survey 2009)       
Survey 2005           
            
Survey 2007  0.080***  0.068**  0.072*  –0.089***  0.019 
   (0.008)  (0.033)  (0.051)  (0.010)  (0.593) 
Wage change frequency (Reference group: lower than annual)    
Higher than annual  0.059  0.125*  0.064  0.092  0.228 
   (0.192)  (0.052)  (0.232)  (0.105)  (0.560) 
Annual –0.022  0.001  –0.014  0.059  0.146 
   (0.583)  (0.970)  (0.744)  (0.136)  (0.828) 
State-dependent wage 
setting  –0.012 –0.013 –0.012 0.058  0.018 
   (0.688)  (0.675)  (0.612)  (0.103)  (0.771) 
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Remuneration (Reference group: Monthly) 
Piece-rate remuneration  –0.091**  –0.064**  –0.059  0.053  0.094 
   (0.027)  (0.041)  (0.126)  (0.153)  (0.759) 
Hourly remuneration  –0.025  –0.014  –0.019  0.021  0.019 
   (0.459)  (0.686)  (0.496)  (0.605)  (0.783) 
Bonus (%)  0.134  0.160  0.109  0.119  0.018 
   (0.124)  (0.149)  (0.192)  (0.344)  (0.977) 
Collective agreement  0.001  0.030  0.006  0.066  0.071 
   (0.987)  (0.630)  (0.891)  (0.327)  (0.371) 
Rho     0.025     
       (0.780)     
Chi-square statistic    1.817      45.61*** 
     (0.178)      (0.000) 
Observations 475  682  474    682 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.65
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Appendix 9: Probit and Heckman probit regressions: 
combined measure of asymmetric reaction 
 
Shocks in sales turnover, output price and/or labour productivity 
 
    Structural equation  Selection equation 








Main occupational group (Reference group: Low-skilled blue-collar)    
High-skilled blue-collar  –0.002 0.001  0.038  0.022 0.045** 
   (0.957)  (0.976)  (0.300)  (0.390)  (0.037) 
Low-skilled white-collar  –0.001  –0.008 0.039  0.023 0.057* 
   (0.988)  (0.888)  (0.578)  (0.520)  (0.070) 
High-skilled white-collar  0.035 0.018 0.072  –0.045 0.006 
   (0.593)  (0.745)  (0.321)  (0.351)  (0.898) 
Sector (Reference group: Manufacturing)       
Construction sector  0.139***  0.146***  0.122*  0.084***  0.075** 
   (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.095)  (0.007)  (0.017) 
Trade  sector  –0.006 0.007 –0.011 0.040 0.041 
   (0.899)  (0.855)  (0.802)  (0.198)  (0.135) 
Services sector  0.029  0.040  0.023  0.056**  0.035 
   (0.487)  (0.256)  (0.593)  (0.047)  (0.138) 
Competition (Reference group: No/marginal competition)    
Average competition  0.113***  0.115***  0.128**  0.031  0.026 
   (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.020)  (0.350)  (0.386) 
Severe competition  0.209***  0.198***  0.246***  0.051  0.056* 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.122)  (0.057) 
Size (Reference group: 20 or less employees)       
21–100 employees  –0.090**  –0.070** –0.077**  0.029  0.014 
   (0.013)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.223)  (0.492) 
101 or more employees  –0.127*** –0.099**  –0.107*** 0.033  0.024 
   (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.264)  (0.312) 
Share of labour costs in total costs (Reference group: Up to 10%)     
11–25%  0.062 0.057 0.100 0.027  0.057** 
   (0.192)  (0.169)  (0.103)  (0.473)  (0.028) 
26–50% 0.133***  0.122***  0.167***  0.017  0.051** 
   (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.653)  (0.041) 
51–100% 0.177***  0.164***  0.201**  0.065  0.070* 
   (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.017)  (0.111)  (0.069) 
Survey year (Reference group: Survey 2009)       
Survey 2005  –0.218***  –0.222*** –0.162*** –0.294***  –0.252***
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Survey 2007  –0.123***  –0.108*** –0.099*** –0.061*  –0.077***
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.062)  (0.000) 
Wage change frequency (Reference group: lower than annual)    
Higher than annual  0.075  0.074  0.048  0.108***  0.082** 
   (0.184)  (0.162)  (0.429)  (0.000)  (0.020) 
Annual 0.080**  0.083***  0.070*  0.074***  0.040 66
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   (0.036)  (0.010)  (0.070)  (0.002)  (0.101) 
State-dependent wage 
setting 0.000  –0.008  –0.002  0.006  0.002 
   (0.999)  (0.767)  (0.933)  (0.782)  (0.901) 
Remuneration (Reference group: Monthly)          
Piece-rate  remuneration 0.082* 0.093**  0.069 0.072***  0.064*** 
   (0.072)  (0.026)  (0.155)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Hourly remuneration  0.045  0.040  0.033  –0.047*  –0.032 
   (0.256)  (0.261)  (0.417)  (0.090)  (0.132) 
Bonus (%)  –0.103  –0.091  –0.197*  0.065  0.085* 
   (0.265)  (0.267)  (0.068)  (0.247)  (0.052) 
Collective agreement  –0.060  –0.065  –0.115** 0.084*** 0.071*** 
   (0.226)  (0.153)  (0.022)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
Rho     –0.063     
       (0.596)     
Chi-square statistic    11.09***    99.55*** 
     (0.001)      (0.000) 
Observations 801  917  738  917  936 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Robust p-values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.
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